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[T]o those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, 
my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our 
national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to 
America’s enemies, and pause to America’s friends. They encourage 
people of good will to remain silent in the face of evil.1
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of what has been called the “biggest intelligence 
leak” in the National Security Agency’s (NSA) history,2 exposing 
“dragnet government surveillance”3 of American communications 
1. Department of Justice Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While 
Defending Against Terrorism: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
107th Cong. 313 (2001) (statement of John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United 
States) (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, Ewen MacAskill & Laura Poitras, Edward 
Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN
(June 9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-
nsa-whistleblower-surveillance. 
3. Joe Mullin, Anti-Spying Activists Plan Rallies Across US on July 4th 
Holiday, LAW & DISORDER/CIVILIZATION & DISCONTENTS (July 2, 2013), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/07/anti-spying-activists-plan-rallies-across-
us-on-july-4th-holiday/ (“The focus is on changing Section 215 of the Patriot Act, 
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and the sharing of that communication between agencies, the country 
convulsed and began discussing drastic measures to rein in 
surveillance practices: defunding the NSA,4 repealing § 215 of the 
PATRIOT Act,5 and severely limiting the FBI’s authority to collect 
domestic communications under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA).6 Months later, the furor has died down, but 
as new information from Mr. Snowden’s massive trove continues to 
trickle in, there is still discussion of reform, albeit less drastic.7
Successful, systemic reform of our surveillance culture requires 
more than a reflexive response to the latest locus of public outrage; it 
requires an understanding of the complex conditions that support its 
existence. This Article suggests that our culture of surveillance is the 
result of more than just a specific statute or a specific institution.
Through a detailed study of the development and evolution of the 
Attorney General Guidelines, this Article suggests that agencies, 
engaging in constitutional interpretation with very little oversight or 
transparency, have shifted the boundaries of acceptable activities and 
norms regarding domestic surveillance.
which is believed to be the legal justification for the dragnet government 
surveillance uncovered by recent NSA leaks.”).
4. Gregory Ferenstein, The NSA Won a Defunding Battle, but It Could 
Lose the War, TECHCRUNCH (July 25, 2013), http://techcrunch.com/2013/07/25/the-
nsa-won-yesterdays-battle-but-it-could-lose-the-war/ (“Yesterday, July 24th, the 
House of Representatives nearly ratified the most brazen amendment to completely 
cut off funds for any broad NSA spying program (failing 205-217).” (emphasis 
omitted)).
5. Stephen Dinan, Top Senator Calls for Scrapping Key Snooping Patriot 
Act Section, WASH. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2013), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/sep/24/sen-leahy-scrap-key-patriot-
act-section/?page=all.
6. Pete Kasperowicz, Leahy Offers Bill to Sunset FISA Provisions, HILL
(June 24, 2013), http://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/senate/307423-bipartisan-
senate-group-proposes-patriot-act-fisa-reforms.
7. Charlie Savage, Obama to Call for End to N.S.A.’s Bulk Data 
Collection, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/25/us/obama-to-seek-nsa-curb-on-call-
data.html?_r=2; Josh Gerstein, Obama Plans New Limits on NSA Surveillance,
POLITICO (Dec. 5, 2013), http://www.politico.com/politico44/2013/12/obama-plans-
new-limits-on-nsa-surveillance-178986.html (quoting President Obama as stating, 
“‘I’ll be proposing some self-restraint on the NSA[. A]nd . . . to initiate some 
reforms that can give people more confidence.’” (quoting Interview by Chris 
Matthews with Barack Obama, President of the United States, on Hardball with 
Chris Matthews (MSNBC television broadcast Dec. 5, 2013), available at
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/53755285/ns/msnbc-
hardball_with_chris_matthews/#.UwEPTF 5-imE)).
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As a number of academics have noted, agencies are 
increasingly involved in the business of constitutional interpretation.8
This aspect of agency life has been termed “administrative 
constitutionalism.” Administrative constitutionalism is a type of 
extra-judicial constitutionalism that focuses on the role of agencies in 
constitutional interpretation. It is an instantiation of popular 
constitutionalism that views agencies as the front line of 
constitutional interpretation, taking the first shot at implementing 
congressional statutes and applying judicial doctrine.
Administrative constitutionalism has been championed by 
academics as an important and underexplored aspect of 
constitutional interpretation.9 Professor Sophia Lee, for example, has 
8. For example, the Department of Justice (DOJ), in coordination with the 
Pentagon and the State Department, determines the constitutional boundaries of 
drone warfare. See infra note 269 and accompanying text. The U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office broadly interprets the scope of patentability as provided by its 
governing statutes and the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Wm. Redin Woodward, A 
Reconsideration of the Patent System as a Problem of Administrative Law, 55 
HARV. L. REV. 950 (1942). And, as Gillian Metzger has recently noted, “The 
Department of Education and the Department of Justice (DOJ) jointly issue 
guidance explaining how elementary and secondary schools can voluntarily consider 
race consistently with governing constitutional law.” Gillian E. Metzger, 
Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1897 (2013).
9. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 8, at 1898 (arguing that “instances of 
administrative constitutionalism are a frequent occurrence, reflecting the reality that 
most governing occurs at the administrative level and thus that is where 
constitutional issues often arise” (footnote omitted)); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. &
JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1
(2010); Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative 
Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV. 799, 804 
(2010) (documenting the FCC and FPC “administrators’ interpretation of several 
aspects of equal protection—primarily the state action doctrine, affirmative equality 
rights, and affirmative action—to show how they advanced constitutional policies 
that imaginatively extended or retracted, increasingly diverged from, and even 
contradicted courts’ constitutional doctrine” (footnote omitted)); Gillian E. Metzger,
Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 421, 427 (2010) (“Recognizing the interrelationship between 
constitutional law and ordinary administrative law is important both for the ongoing 
debate over the legitimacy of constitutional common law and for the proper 
appreciation of the role administrative agencies can play in our constitutional 
order.”); Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise: Administrative Censorship 
and the Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1, 15-18, 27-28
(2000) (examining how the de facto role agencies play in statutory interpretation 
gives agencies a de facto role in determining the scope of First Amendment 
protections); Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the 
Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 568-69 (2007) (describing 
how Congress and the Post Office developed communications privacy based on 
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provided one of the first detailed factual account of the interpretative 
practices of the Federal Communications Commission and the 
Federal Power Commission, demonstrating that agencies are actively 
engaged in constitutional interpretation.10
Professors Bill Eskridge and John Ferejohn build upon this 
descriptive account and argue that agencies are and should be
constitutional norm entrepreneurs.11 In their view, new constitutional 
norms are like “trial balloons hoisted by agencies . . . subject to 
public critique as well as veto by courts, legislatures, and other 
executive branch officials.”12 This interbranch, intergovernmental, 
and public deliberation, Eskridge and Ferejohn argue, is the 
“dominant governmental mechanism for the evolution of America’s
fundamental normative commitments.”13 The dialogic process leads 
to consensus around these proposed norms that reflects public 
opinion and political compromise. The consensus around these 
norms then slowly becomes entrenched, and such entrenched norms, 
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue, should be respected by the Supreme 
Court. 
Eskridge and Ferejohn further claim that this process of small-
“c” constitutionalism is a superior way to ascribe meaning to the big-
“C” Constitution, finding that “it is more adaptable to changed 
circumstances . . . [and] is more legitimate than the Constitutional 
updating that unelected judges routinely accomplish in the default of 
a workable Constitutional amendment process.”14 Administrative 
constitutionalism, so understood, posits as its central claim that 
extra-constitutional principles later adopted by the Supreme Court in their Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence).
10. See Lee, supra note 9, at 800-01, 803-04.
11. Norms are traditionally distinguished from legal rules on a number of 
dimensions, but the central distinction is that “norms are enforced by some means 
other than legal sanctions.” See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, 
Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 350 (1997). As 
reviewed and synthesized in McAdams’s article, the scholarship exploring the
interaction between law and norms is extensive and interdisciplinary, with 
economists, sociologists, and legal academics all having contributed to the study of 
the origin and function of norms. See generally id. In this Article, norms are used to 
describe those principles and policies that are reflected in and embraced by the 
electorate, regardless of legal sanction. However, the process of norm 
entrepreneurship and entrenchment, as explored later in this Paper, is oftentimes 
intertwined with the creation of laws, regulations, or non-legally binding internal 
guidelines.
12. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 9, at 33.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 18.
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administrative agencies should regularly engage in constitutional
norm entrepreneurship, beginning a process of national deliberation 
that results in the entrenchment of norms that reflect the majority 
viewpoint. 
This Article builds upon the work of these scholars. Through a 
historical and analytical study of the development and evolution of 
the Attorney General Guidelines, the governing document for the 
FBI, this Article demonstrates that agencies, in their role as norm 
entrepreneurs, can also engage in what I call “shadow administrative 
constitutionalism”—a process of agency-norm entrepreneurship and 
entrenchment that occurs without the necessary public consultation, 
deliberation, and accountability. Furthermore, this Article identifies 
the hospitable conditions of the national security arena that support 
shadow administrative constitutionalism. While these conditions may 
prove commonplace and not unique to the national security arena, 
such an analysis is beyond the scope of this Article.
The evolution of the Attorney General Guidelines suggests that 
the deliberation that Eskridge and Ferejohn demand in response to 
agency norm entrepreneurship naturally occurs only in those rare 
instances when we find ourselves in a national conversation—when 
the entire country is galvanized around a major reinterpretation of 
our rights framework. Outside of these moments, our national 
security institutions are insular organizations often operating under 
the radar of meaningful checks and balances. They operate with an 
institutional proclivity towards mission creep and the norms 
developed become entrenched through a process of path-dependency 
and faith in historical practice. This corrupted process of agency 
norm entrepreneurship and entrenchment is what I call shadow 
administrative constitutionalism. It is a process in which agency 
norm entrepreneurship does not reflect public values and is not met 
with the dialogic process assumed by Eskridge and Ferejohn, but 
nevertheless leads to the entrenchment of norms that are far from 
democratically obtained. Furthermore, I argue that shadow 
administrative constitutionalism in the national security arena is 
inevitable without the manufactured interventions of deliberation-
forcing mechanisms. 
The Article proceeds in six parts. Part I provides a snapshot of 
agency norm entrepreneurship that demonstrates the power and 
promise of administrative constitutionalism. This Part traces the 
growth of the FBI’s domestic surveillance program from its early
years until the country was forced into a national conversation on the 
government surveillance norms that had emerged over the greater 
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part of the twentieth century. In response to this national 
conversation, the DOJ developed the first-ever Attorney General 
Guidelines to govern the FBI’s domestic surveillance activity. The 
Guidelines, known as the Levi Guidelines,15 represented a model 
instance of agency norm entrepreneurship. By striking a balance 
between national security needs and civil-liberties guarantees that 
reflected the tenor of the time, the Levi Guidelines provide an 
excellent example of agency norm entrepreneurship and a positive 
snapshot of administrative constitutionalism.
Part II provides an account of shadow administrative 
constitutionalism at work. This Part details the historical evolution of 
the Guidelines and the reemergence of surveillance norms. This 
reemergence suggests a weakness of administrative constitutionalism 
in practice: after the dust settles and our collective attention begins to 
fade, agencies continue to actively engage in norm entrepreneurship, 
but now they do so within the isolated echo chambers of the agencies 
themselves.
Parts III and IV together explore the rationale behind and 
consequence of the norms developed in the account of shadow 
administrative constitutionalism provided in Part II. Part III attributes 
the instinct toward aggressive national security norms to the 
powerful, loosely defined nature of the national security mandate and 
the medieval structure of bureaucracy. Part IV discusses the process 
by which norms become entrenched in shadow administrative 
constitutionalism through its two component parts: path dependency 
and faith in historical practice. Part IV closes with a discussion of the 
consequence of this account of shadow administrative 
constitutionalism: surveillance culture. Together, Parts III and IV 
illustrate that, without the necessary oversight and deliberation, 
administrative constitutionalism can morph from a powerfully 
democratic approach to defining the values that bind our country to 
an illegitimate process by which the bureaucratic impulses of 
unelected agency actors slowly shape our values and our law. 
Part V studies the features of policymaking in the national 
security arena that inhibit oversight and deliberation. In particular, 
this Part posits that the “super-deference” granted agencies in charge 
of national security issues and the secrecy under which national 
15. The Levi Guidelines were named after then Attorney General Edward
Levi. Letter from Edward H. Levi, Att’y Gen. of the United States, to Clarence M. 
Kelley, Dir., FBI (Nov. 4, 1976), reprinted in FBI Statutory Charter: Hearings 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 18 (1978) [hereinafter Levi 
Guidelines].
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security must necessarily operate makes oversight and deliberation 
particularly difficult. 
Part VI identifies the weak internal and external checks and 
balances that further facilitated shadow administrative 
constitutionalism and suggests structural solutions to improve the 
oversight and deliberation necessary to ensure the legitimacy of 
administrative constitutionalism.
I. ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AT WORK 
The Administrative State can be a powerful democratic force in 
the process of constitutional interpretation. This Part provides a 
snapshot of administrative constitutionalism at its best: an agency 
engaging in norm entrepreneurship as part of a broader national 
conversation regarding how to define the scope of civil-liberties 
protections in the context of national security threats. It moves in 
three Sections. First, it provides a brief account of the J. Edgar 
Hoover years at the FBI, with a particular focus on the years 
spanning between World War II and the early 1970s. This Section 
illustrates the three dominant, problematic features of the Hoover 
FBI: the unrestrained expansion of the FBI’s mission, the pursuit of 
the mission through illegal means, and the creation of an 
intelligence-gathering process cloaked in secrecy. Second, I describe 
the momentous year of 1972, when three important incidents—the 
Keith case,16 Watergate, and Laird v. Tatum17—brought the issue of 
domestic surveillance to a head and launched a national debate about 
how to both protect civil liberties and national security. Third, I 
describe the norm entrepreneurship that followed, where the 
Department of Justice, drawing from the tone and tenor of the 
national conversation and the recommendations of a congressional 
investigatory committee, introduced the Attorney General Guidelines 
to govern the FBI—a proposed method of striking that difficult 
balance between preserving civil liberties and national security. 
These Guidelines provide a perfect snapshot of the first stage of 
administrative constitutionalism, norm entrepreneurship, at work.
16. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
17. 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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A. Surveillance and the Hoover Years
For nearly five decades, J. Edgar Hoover’s name was 
synonymous with the FBI. He came to the FBI as its founding 
Director and left it only in death, after forty-eight years of service.18
The Hoover years covered an incredibly tumultuous time in the 
country’s history: over the course of his tenure, the United States 
experienced Prohibition, the growth of organized crime, World War 
II, the Cold War, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Korean and 
Vietnam Wars. By some measures, it was during Hoover’s tenure 
that the country first began to need a federal investigative body to 
protect the country from domestic and international threats. 
Though the FBI was originally created as a federal 
investigative body to aid in the prosecution of federal crimes, World 
War II expanded the FBI’s mandate to include surveillance for 
national security purposes.19 The original order from President 
Roosevelt to J. Edgar Hoover in 1934 was simply to conduct a one-
time investigation of the Nazi movement within the United States; 
however, two years later, Roosevelt asked for a more “systematic 
collection of intelligence” about Fascism and Communism.20 By the 
end of World War II, the intelligence apparatus was equipped with 
“bureaucratic momentum” and had gained public acceptance as a 
“substantial permanent intelligence system.”21
Furthermore, during the Hoover Years, the modern conception 
of a powerful, unitary executive emerged from “the retention of 
powers accrued during the emergency of World War II.”22 One such 
power was the executive authority used to establish and sustain the 
18. While the FBI was only formally created in 1935, its predecessor 
organization was the Bureau of Investigation for which Hoover was the director 
beginning May 10, 1924. See A Brief History of the FBI, FBI,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/brief-history (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). The 
forty-eight-year term of service includes Hoover’s time as Director of the Bureau of 
Investigation and the FBI. See John Edgar Hoover, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/history/directors/hoover (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
19. See A Brief History of the FBI, supra note 18.
20. See S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. II, at 25 (1976). This paper draws on many 
of the factual details and findings of this study of U.S. intelligence activities 
conducted by the U.S. Senate, which was led by Senator Frank Church. By its own 
account, this study “conducted the only thorough investigation ever made of United 
States intelligence and its post World War II emergence as a complex, sophisticated 
system of multiple agencies and extensive activities.” Id. bk. I, at 7.
21. Id. at 9-10.
22. Id. at 10.
68 Michigan State Law Review 2014:59
intelligence community during World War II.23 When initially 
petitioning for an expansion of the FBI’s intelligence-gathering 
mandate on the eve of World War II, Hoover contended that the FBI 
Appropriations Act passed during World War I already authorized
the proposed expansion.24 However, “[t]here [was] no evidence that 
either the Congress in 1916 or Attorney General Stone in 1924 
intended the provision of the appropriations statute to authorize the 
establishment of a permanent domestic intelligence structure.”25
Nevertheless, to maintain his agency’s intelligence authorities as 
World War II loomed on the horizon, Hoover advised Attorney 
General Homer Cummings and President Franklin Roosevelt in 1938 
that the 1916 appropriations statute that applied to the World War I-
era intelligence program was “‘sufficiently broad’” to allow the 
President to “expan[d] . . . the present intelligence and counter-
espionage work” as “deemed necessary” by the executive branch.26
As the Church Committee later discovered, because both Roosevelt 
and Cummings wanted to keep the intelligence program secret and 
wished to avoid a consultation with Congress on the matter, neither 
man questioned Hoover’s interpretation of the statute and Roosevelt 
signed an executive order authorizing domestic intelligence-
gathering activity in anticipation of World War II.27
In 1939, President Roosevelt issued another directive, which 
“was the closest thing to a formal charter for FBI and military 
domestic intelligence.”28 It was three paragraphs long and simply 
stated that “‘investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and 
sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’” in coordination with the Intelligence Divisions of the 
Army and Navy.29 With that, a formal intelligence-gathering program 
was instituted in the United States at the behest of the President.30
This three-paragraph “charter” was the FBI’s central form of 
governance until the intelligence reforms of the 1970s.31 As a result, 
23. Id.
24. Id. bk. II, at 28-29.
25. Id. bk. III, at 400.
26. Id.
27. Id.; see also TIM WEINER, ENEMIES: A HISTORY OF THE FBI 80 (2013).
28. S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. III, at 402.
29. Id. at 403 (quoting a confidential memorandum from the President).
30. See id.
31. Id. at 548-49 (describing the testimony of Assistant Attorney General 
Robert Mardian in March of 1971 that “neither the Department nor the Bureau had 
‘any specific published regulation or guideline’ for the collection of intelligence 
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national security remained predominantly under the purview of the 
executive branch, with intelligence agencies continuing to report 
directly to the President and operating with immense authority and 
little oversight.32
Finally, during Hoover’s tenure, the country began to witness 
the development of powerful monitoring and surveillance equipment 
as a result of the research and development and capacity-building 
efforts that came with World War II and the subsequent arms race of 
the Cold War. For example, the Strategic Arms Litigation Talks 
(SALT) negotiations of the late 1960s and the treaties that emerged 
were “possible because technological advances ma[d]e it possible to 
accurately monitor arms limitations” remotely.33 As later noted by 
the congressionally appointed Select Committee to Study 
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 
more commonly known as the “Church Committee” for its 
Chairman, Senator Frank Church, these “technological innovations . 
. . markedly increased the agencies’ intelligence collection 
capabilities.”34
These characteristics of the post-World War II era proved to be 
particularly hospitable to the growth of an underground but powerful 
domestic surveillance regime. For example, these conditions allowed 
for the development of the infamous Counterintelligence Program 
(COINTELPRO). COINTELPRO was created to target the 
“Communist threat” in the United States, but, soon, “the program 
widened to other targets, increasingly concentrating on domestic 
dissenters.”35 Between 1956 and 1971, the program actively 
“‘disrupt[ed]’ groups and ‘neutralize[d]’ individuals deemed to be 
threats to domestic security.”36
Importantly, COINTELPRO “was not designed to build 
traditional cases to be brought to trial”; rather, the program was 
developed in response to the FBI’s “frustrat[ion] with Supreme Court 
limits on overt investigations of dissident groups” such as the 
about civil disturbances”) Indeed, the investigations were “based on the 1939 
Roosevelt directives.” Id.
32. See id.
33. Id. bk. I, at 10.
34. Id.
35. Id. bk. II, at 65; see also JEROME P. BJELOPERA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41780, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS 
24 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41780.pdf.
36. S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. II, at 10; see also WEINER, supra note 27, at 
195, 292-93. 
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Socialist Workers Party, the Ku Klux Klan, the New Left, and the 
Black Panther Party.37 The constitutional limits on government 
surveillance placed by the Supreme Court led the FBI to conduct 
surveillance in secret and in a manner that intentionally avoided 
judicial review.38
COINTELPRO ultimately extended its purview to include all 
“‘person[s] who trie[d] to arouse people to violent action by 
appealing to their emotions, prejudices, et cetera,’” and, once 
identified, such persons were placed on the FBI’s “Rabble Rouser 
Index,” later renamed the “Agitator Index.”39 This list targeted a 
number of nonviolent civil rights organizations including the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference.40 The Church Committee 
later determined that FBI Headquarters had developed over 500,000 
domestic intelligence files on Americans and domestic groups,
including the NAACP, the Women’s Liberation Movement, and 
Conservative American Christian Action Council.41 COINTELPRO 
embodied the FBI’s disregard for civil liberties. It targeted 
individuals and organizations precisely because of their First 
Amendment-protected political speech and associational activity. 
COINTELPRO illustrates the three prominent features of the 
Hoover FBI: the unrestrained expansion of the FBI’s mission, the 
pursuit of mission through illegal means, and the creation of an 
intelligence-gathering process cloaked in secrecy. 
First, with Hoover at the helm, the FBI gradually expanded its 
mission from strictly federal law enforcement,42 to domestic 
intelligence gathering for wartime national security, and finally to 
37. BJELOPERA, supra note 35, at 24; see also S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. II, at 
67.
38. BJELOPERA, supra note 35, at 24.
39. S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. II, at 90 (quoting the 1967 FBI Rabble Rouser 
Index).
40. BJELOPERA, supra note 35, at 24.
41. S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. II, at 6-8.
42. The FBI was limited to federal law enforcement in its early days in part 
because of the scandal caused by the “Palmer Raids” of the 1920s. ALPHEUS 
THOMAS MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 113-14 (1956).
Responding to the mass arrests of innocent individuals, Attorney General Harlan 
Fiske Stone limited the Bureau of Investigation, which preceded the FBI, to the 
investigation of federal crimes. See id. at 150. Stone ordered Hoover, then Acting 
Director of the Bureau, to limit the work of the FBI “‘strictly to investigations of 
violation of law, under my direction or under the direction of an Assistant Attorney 
General regularly conducting the work of the Department of Justice.’” Id. at 151 
(quoting a 1924 memorandum from U.S. Attorney General Harlan F. Stone to J. 
Edgar Hoover). 
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domestic intelligence gathering to preserve social and political order 
within the United States. “The absence of precise standards for 
intelligence investigations” in part led to this overgrowth.43 As the 
Church Committee later found, intelligence standards and limitations 
set out by Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone after World War I 
were abandoned by the FBI in favor of internally issued mandates to 
investigate “‘subversion’”—a term that remained undefined—and 
“‘potential’ rather than actual or likely criminal conduct, as well as 
[mandates] to collect general intelligence on lawful political and 
social dissent.”44
Second, without guidelines defining the boundaries of 
acceptable activity, the FBI pursued its mission through a number of 
illegal methods.45 This included targeting individuals, organizations, 
and ideologies in violation of the First Amendment and the equal 
protection guarantees of the Constitution.46 Furthermore, as part of 
COINTELPRO and other agency initiatives, FBI agents illegally 
opened the private mail of American citizens, intercepted their 
cables, and wiretapped and bugged their private conversations 
without judicial warrant.47 Armed with this trove of private 
information, the FBI deployed it for political purposes: to mail 
anonymous letters to break up marriages, air the political beliefs of 
individuals to get them fired from their jobs, and falsely label 
members of organizations as government informants in order to 
discredit them within their respective organizations or expose them 
to violent attack.48 When asked about the FBI’s mail opening 
program, one former FBI official justified this illegal behavior by 
explaining that “‘[i]t was my assumption that what we were doing 
was justified by what we had to do . . . [for] the greater good, the
national security.’”49
Third, the FBI was able to sustain its illegal activity by 
operating under a veil of secrecy. President Roosevelt authorized this 
secrecy in his August 1936 directive establishing the basic domestic 
intelligence structure in the United States when he made clear that 
43. S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. II, at 165.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 12.
46. Id. at 12-13.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 10-11.
49. Id. at 14 (quoting the testimony of W.A. Branigan). 
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the domestic intelligence plan to be handled “quite confidentially.”50
This sentiment was later echoed by Hoover when he stated that “‘the 
expansion of the present structure of intelligence work . . . [should] 
proceed[] . . . with the utmost degree of secrecy in order to avoid 
criticism or objections which might be raised to such an expansion 
by either ill-informed persons or individuals having some ulterior 
motive.’”51 Hoover further added, “‘[I]t would seem undesirable to 
seek any special legislation which would draw attention to the fact 
that it was proposed to develop a special counterespionage drive of 
any great magnitude.’”52 The Hoover FBI, operating under the “fear 
of war, and its attendant uncertainties and doubts, ha[d] fostered a 
series of secret practices that ha[d] eroded the processes of open 
democratic government.”53
The Hoover FBI was finally reined in when, in 1972, three 
major incidents forced a national conversation about domestic 
surveillance and intelligence-gathering practices: the Supreme Court 
decision in United States v. U.S. District Court, also known as the 
Keith case, a case that addressed the illegal wiretapping of 
Americans;54 the Watergate break-in; and the Supreme Court 
decision in Laird v. Tatum, a case that addressed First Amendment 
issues arising from Army surveillance of Americans during the Race 
Riots of the 1960s.55
B. The Keith Case
The case arose from the “dynamite bombing of a Central 
Intelligence Agency (‘CIA’) recruitment office . . . in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan” on September 29, 1968.56 Though no one was injured, the 
50. Id. bk. III, at 392 (quoting a Confidential Memorandum by J. Edgar 
Hoover dated August 25, 1936, describing President Roosevelt’s approach to the 
proposed domestic intelligence-gathering program).
51. Id. (quoting a letter from Attorney General Homer Cummings to 
President Roosevelt).
52. Id. (quoting a letter from Attorney General Homer Cummings to 
President Roosevelt). 
53. Id. bk. I, at 9.
54. 407 U.S. 297, 299 (1972).
55. 408 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1972).
56. The Historical Society for the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Michigan provides a useful history describing the event that led 
up to the momentous case. See Samuel C. Damren, The Keith Case, CT. LEGACY,
(Historical Soc’y for the U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., Detroit, Mich.), 
Nov. 2003, at 1, 1, available at
http://www.mied.uscourts.gov/HistoricalSociety/media/newsletters/200311_Court_
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blast left a twelve-inch-by-seven-inch-wide and six-inch-deep 
reminder in the sidewalk of the social unrest in the country.57 John 
Sinclair, Laurence Robert “Pun” Plamondon, and John “Jack”
Waterhouse Forest, “all members of the radical White Panther 
Party,” were indicted, and Judge Damon Keith was appointed to 
preside over the case.58
“On October 5, 1970, the defense filed a [routine] motion for 
the disclosure of electronic surveillance” conducted on the 
defendants.59 “In response to the motion, the prosecution and 
defense” agreed to a stipulation in which “the prosecution 
represented to the court that it had no knowledge of any electronic 
surveillance of the defendants and that the local office of the FBI 
was also unaware of any electronic surveillance.”60 The national 
offices of the FBI, however, had conducted electronic surveillance of 
one of the defendants. At this point, Attorney General Mitchell 
informed the court that government agents had tapped defendant 
Plamondon in the course of its efforts to gather intelligence on 
domestic organizations that were deemed “subversive” and a 
potential threat to the government.61
Then, as the Historical Society for the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan reports, “the government 
filed a motion to dismiss the defendants’ request for disclosure of the 
surveillance evidence[,] . . . certif[ying] that public disclosure of the 
facts concerning surveillance of the defendants would prejudice the 
national interest.”62 Furthermore, the government requested it “be 
notified prior to any decision requiring disclosure of the surveillance 
so that it could determine whether to proceed with the case.”63
Judge Keith rejected the government’s request and, in doing so, 
rejected the “‘Mitchell Doctrine,’ which asserted that the Attorney 
General, as a representative of the executive branch, had the inherent 
constitutional power both to authorize electronic surveillance in 
‘national security’ cases without judicial warrant and to unilaterally 
determine whether a particular circumstance falls within the scope of 
Legacy.pdf. “The bombing was one of eight anti-establishment bombings that had 
occurred in the Detroit area at the time.” Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1-2.
59. Id. at 4.
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a ‘national security’ concern.”64 As a consequence, Judge Keith 
found himself the subject of a mandamus suit.65
In 1972, the mandamus suit reached the Supreme Court, and 
the Court formally rejected the Mitchell Doctrine and affirmed Judge 
Keith’s position that, while there is a constitutional basis for the 
President’s domestic security efforts, “it must be exercised in a 
manner compatible with the Fourth Amendment.”66 Keith held that 
under the particular circumstances presented, the government was 
required to obtain a warrant prior to engaging in electronic 
surveillance of Americans on American soil.67 In doing so, the Court 
also recognized that other procedures might also be constitutionally 
legitimate depending on the circumstances presented.68 Specifically, 
the Court recognized that “the focus of domestic surveillance may be 
less precise than that directed against more conventional types of 
crime” and that, as such, Congress might deem it necessary to apply 
different standards to domestic surveillance not conducted in pursuit 
of a crime already governed by the Wiretap Statute.69 At the same 
time, however, the Court recognized that the need for extra 
flexibility in national security-motivated domestic surveillance is 
counterbalanced by the fact that such cases “often reflect a 
convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not present in 
cases of ‘ordinary’ crime.”70
The Court further emphasized that the “danger to political 
dissent is acute where the Government attempts to act under so 
vague a concept as the power to protect ‘domestic security.’”71
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell rung a warning bell, reminding 
us that
[t]he price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an 
unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official 
eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of 
Government action in private conversation. For private dissent, no less 
than open public discourse, is essential to our free society.72
64. Id.
65. United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
66. Id. at 320.
67. Id. at 321-22.
68. Id. at 322-23.
69. Id. at 322.
70. Id. at 313 (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 314.
72. Id.
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C. Watergate
On June 17, 1972, two days before Keith was decided, the 
Watergate break-in occurred.73 While the Watergate break-in and the 
bugging of the Democratic Party Headquarters was just one of many 
instances of the “political spying and sabotage conducted on behalf 
of President Nixon’s re-election,”74 the incident was key to exposing 
the systematic and illegal surveillance practices.
As the celebrated reporters Woodward and Bernstein reported, 
“hundreds of thousands of dollars in Nixon campaign contributions 
had been set aside to pay for an extensive undercover campaign 
aimed at discrediting individual Democratic presidential candidates 
and disrupting their campaigns.”75 The campaign 
included[ f]ollowing members of Democratic candidates’ families and 
assembling dossiers on their personal lives; forging letters and distributing 
them under the candidates’ letterheads; leaking false and manufactured 
items to the press; throwing campaign schedules into disarray; seizing 
confidential campaign files; and investigating the lives of dozens of 
Democratic campaign workers.76
The Nixon Administration had gone so far as to break into a 
psychiatrist’s office to obtain the medical history of Daniel Ellsberg, 
the former defense analyst who leaked the Pentagon Papers, in order 
to discredit him.77 As one former Nixon staffer described: 
[Nixon] ordered me and the others, a group that would come to be called 
the “plumbers,” to find out how the leak had happened and keep it from 
happening again. Mr. Hunt urged us to carry out a “covert operation” to 
get a “mother lode” of information about Mr. Ells-berg’s mental state, to 
discredit him, by breaking into the office of his psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis 
Fielding. Mr. Liddy told us the F.B.I. had frequently carried out such 
covert operations––a euphemism for burglaries––in national security 
investigations, that he had even done some himself.78
73. Alfred E. Lewis, 5 Held in Plot to Bug Democrats’ Office Here, WASH.
POST (June 18, 1972), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2002/05/31/AR2005111001227.html.
74. Carl Bernstein & Bob Woodward, FBI Finds Nixon Aides Sabotaged 





77. Egil Krogh, Op-Ed., The Break-In That History Forgot, N.Y. TIMES
(June 30, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/30/opinion/30krogh.html.
78. Id.
76 Michigan State Law Review 2014:59
The Watergate scandal placed on public display both the extent of 
and abuse of domestic surveillance activities by the executive 
branch.
D. Laird v. Tatum
In the same year Keith was decided, the Supreme Court 
considered the constitutionality of the Army’s surveillance of 
American citizens in Laird v. Tatum.79 The case stemmed from a 
program in which President Lyndon Johnson ordered the Army to 
assist local authorities in managing the riots springing up across the 
country after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in 
1967.80 In this capacity, the Army began a data gathering effort in 
order to facilitate “more detailed and specific contingency planning 
designed to permit the Army, when called upon to assist local 
authorities, to be able to respond effectively with a minimum of 
force.”81
The data-gathering effort consisted of the United States Army 
collecting information on citizens and civil rights organizations by 
surreptitiously attending public meetings and culling information 
from newspapers to identify flashpoint issues, planned protest 
activities, and key persons within the organizations.82 Furthermore, 
the Army maintained political files on prominent public officials 
holding office in the United States Congress.83 The rationale 
provided for this surveillance, as the Court of Appeals observed, was 
that, because “the Army is sent into territory almost invariably 
unfamiliar to most soldiers and their commanders, their need for 
79. 408 U.S. 1, 2 (1972).
80. Id. at 4-5. The President couched his authority to order such a program 
in 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2006), which states:
Whenever there is an insurrections [sic] in any State against its 
government, the President may, upon the request of its legislature or of its 
governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal service 
such of the militia of the other States, in the number requested by that 
State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to 
suppress the insurrection.
10 U.S.C. § 331; see also Tatum, 408 U.S. at 3-4.
81. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 5.
82. Id. at 6.
83. Files were maintained on Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III and 
Congressman Abner J. Mikva. S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. II, at 8 (1976); see also
George C. Christie, Government Surveillance and Individual Freedom: A Proposed 
Statutory Response to Laird v. Tatum and the Broader Problem of Government 
Surveillance of the Individual, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 871, 872 (1972).
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information is likely to be greater than that of the hometown 
policeman.”84
The plaintiffs in Tatum were “four individuals and nine
unincorporated associations engaged in lawful political activity, 
including but not limited to union organizing, public speaking, 
peaceful assembly, petitioning the government, newspaper 
editorializing, and educating the public about political issues.”85 The 
plaintiffs alleged that their constitutionally protected expressive 
activities were subject to unlawful monitoring by the Army, thereby
chilling their ability to speak freely.86
The Court dismissed the case, holding that the plaintiffs did not 
present a justiciable controversy because they did not show evidence 
of an objective harm or the threat of a specific future harm.87 The 
Court refused to recognize the plaintiffs’ allegations of a “subjective 
chill” on their speech arising “merely from the individual’s
knowledge that a governmental agency was engaged in certain 
activities or from the individual’s concomitant fear that, armed with 
the fruits of those activities, the agency might in the future take some 
other and additional action detrimental to that individual.”88 Thus, 
plaintiffs alleging harms of free speech and association resulting 
from a publicly known domestic surveillance program operated by 
the U.S. government must put forth evidence that they themselves
were the subjects of said surveillance and, further, that the 
surveillance created an objective harm in order for a constitutional 
challenge to the surveillance to be considered justiciable. In so 
holding, the Court overturned the lower court’s more liberal 
construction of the standing requirement requiring only a “likelihood
84. Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 952-53 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev’d, 408 U.S. 
1 (1972).
85. Brief for Respondents at 4, Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (No. 71-288).
86. Id. at 2-3.
87. See Tatum, 408 U.S. at 3 (“We granted certiorari to consider whether, as 
the Court of Appeals held, respondents presented a justiciable controversy in 
complaining of a ‘chilling’ effect on the exercise of their First Amendment rights 
where such effect is allegedly caused, not by any ‘specific action of the Army 
against them, [but] only [by] the existence and operation of the intelligence 
gathering and distributing system, which is confined to the Army and related civilian 
investigative agencies.’ We reverse.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Tatum, 444 F.2d at 953)).
88. Id. at 11.
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that [the surveillance] will affect” the exercise of First Amendment 
rights.89
Tatum made clear that while government surveillance was 
indeed a problem facing the American public, the courts were not 
going to be quick to intervene.
E. A National Conversation 
With Keith, Watergate, and Tatum all coming to a head in 
1972, the country was quickly forced into a national dialogue about 
the constitutional boundaries of executive power, the scope of the 
national security mandate, and the appropriateness of domestic 
intelligence gathering. To both represent and inform the public in 
this conversation, a special committee was created by Congress and 
tasked with the job of assessing the intelligence-gathering practices 
of the government. This committee became known as the “Church 
Committee” under the chairmanship of Senator Frank Church, and in 
1976, it published the “Church Committee Report.”90 The scathing 
report famously found that “[t]oo many people have been spied upon 
by too many Government agencies and to [sic] much information has 
beeen [sic] collected.”91
The Church Committee made two important findings. First, 
that the surveillance program had “adversely affected the 
constitutional rights of particular Americans,” resulting in a harm 
that “extend[ed] far beyond the citizens directly affected.”92 The 
Committee was concerned that “[w]ithout clear limits, a federal 
investigative agency would ‘have enough on enough people’ so that 
‘even if it does not elect to prosecute them’ the Government would . . 
. still ‘find no opposition to its policies.’”93 Second, the Church 
Committee attributed the radical growth of surveillance programs to 
a failure of our system of checks and balances. As the Committee 
noted, “In the field of intelligence those restraints have too often 
been ignored.”94 The Committee attributed this imbalance to: (1) the 
growth of presidential power, particularly in the area of intelligence 
89. Davis v. Ichord, 442 F.2d 1207, 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (emphasis 
added).
90. See S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. I, at ii (1976).
91. Id. bk. II, at 5.
92. Id. at 290.
93. Id. at 291 (quoting ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE 
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 71 (1955)).
94. Id.
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gathering; (2) the veil of secrecy under which domestic intelligence-
gathering operations were occurring; and (3) the immunization of the 
intelligence community from the restraints of the rule of law.95
The Church Committee provided ninety-six recommended 
reforms to the intelligence-gathering operations.96 The reforms
focused on creating clear prohibitions against government 
intelligence gathering that directly infringes the rights of free speech 
and association; ensuring that any governmental action that affects 
free speech meets the strict scrutiny standard; and developing 
procedural safeguards, or so-called “‘auxiliary precautions,’” to 
provide a redundancy to all substantive prohibitions.97 The 
procedural checks suggested included “judicial review of intelligence 
activity before or after the fact, . . . formal and high level Executive 
branch approval,” more disclosure to the public, and “more effective 
Congressional oversight.”98 Recognizing the limits of its authority to 
execute upon any these recommendations, the Church Committee 
urged, “Congress to turn its attention to legislating restraints upon 
intelligence activities which may endanger the constitutional rights 
of Americans.”99
Responding to national concern and the Church Committee’s
findings, Attorney General Edward Levi, engaging in norm 
entrepreneurship, issued a set of internal guidelines for FBI 
investigations in 1976. These guidelines set forth principles and 
processes that would regulate the FBI’s domestic security operations, 
including its domestic intelligence-gathering efforts.100 The Levi 
Guidelines embraced a number of different solutions for how to 
better balance national security interests with First Amendment 
guarantees.
95. Id. at 292.
96. Id. at 296-339.
97. Id. at 293 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 291 (James Madison) 
(Glazier & Co. 1826)). 
98. Id.
99. Id. at 289.
100. Levi Guidelines, supra note 15, at 18-33. The Attorney General 
Guidelines have since expanded to include guidance information on the use of 
confidential informants, undercover operations, and consensual monitoring 
guidelines. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S COMPLIANCE WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
INVESTIGATIVE GUIDELINES 1 (2005) [hereinafter OIG INVESTIGATION], available at
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0509/final.pdf.
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For example, under the Levi Guidelines, domestic security 
investigations were restricted to ascertaining information on the 
activities of individuals or groups
which involve or will involve the use of force or violence and which 
involve or will involve the violation of federal law, for the purpose of:
(1) overthrowing the government of the United States or the government 
of a State;
(2) substantially interfering, in the United States, with the activities of a 
foreign government or its authorized representatives;
(3) substantially impairing for the purpose of influencing U.S. 
government policies or decisions:
(a) the functioning of the government of the United States;
(b) the functioning of the government of a State; or
(c) interstate commerce;
(4) depriving persons of their civil rights under the Constitution, laws, or 
treaties of the United States.101
These regulations placed a blunt, clear limit on the scope of the 
FBI’s domestic intelligence-gathering authority.
Another such solution was the creation of tiers of FBI domestic 
security investigations to ensure that breadth of investigative 
authority granted to FBI agents bore some relationship to predicate 
factual evidence provided to trigger the investigation. Specifically, 
the Levi Guidelines created three tiers of investigations—
preliminary, limited, and full—each with different attendant 
authorities, factual requirements, and approvals.102 For example, a 
full investigation required “specific and articulable facts giving 
reason to believe that an individual or a group is or may be engaged 
in activities which involve the use of force or violence.”103
Comparatively, preliminary investigations needed only “allegations 
or other information that an individual or a group may be engaged in 
activities which involve or will involve the use of force or 
101. Levi Guidelines, supra note 15, at 20.
102. OIG INVESTIGATION, supra note 100, at 36-37.
103. Levi Guidelines, supra note 15, at 22; see also OIG INVESTIGATION,
supra note 100, at 37; ALLAN ADLER, CTR. FOR NAT’L SEC. STUDIES, A REPORT 
COMPARING THE PROPOSED FBI CHARTER ACT OF 1979 WITH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
LEVI’S DOMESTIC SECURITY GUIDELINES, THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CHURCH 
COMMITTEE, AND OTHER PROPOSALS TO REGULATE FBI INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES 8-
9 (1979).
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violence.”104 As a result of the higher factual predicate requirements, 
full investigations were conducted with a broader set of investigative 
tools than preliminary or limited investigations. However, despite 
being subject to the lowest standard, preliminary investigations 
conducted under the Levi Guidelines still required some factual 
predicate in order to proceed.105
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Levi Guidelines 
recognized that domestic security investigations, by their very 
nature, threatened to chill speech. Accordingly, the Levi Guidelines 
predicated full investigative authority on the balancing of four 
factors: “(1) the magnitude of the threatened harm; (2) the likelihood 
it will occur; (3) the immediacy of the threat; and (4) the danger to 
privacy and free expression posed by a full investigation.”106 Thus, 
the Guidelines explicitly limited the circumstances that called for 
domestic intelligence gathering and further limited the initiation of 
an investigation if the negative impact on First Amendment rights 
outweighed the value of the surveillance.
In the course of implementing the Levi Guidelines, FBI 
Director Clarence M. Kelley further contributed to this spate of norm
entrepreneurship by “shift[ing] supervision of domestic terrorism 
investigations from the FBI’s Intelligence Division to its Criminal 
Investigative Division.”107 The Criminal Investigative Division was 
charged with investigating potential suspects up until the point of the 
decision to prosecute.108 This mandate was fundamentally different 
from the mandate of intelligence gathering, which often lacked a 
104. Levi Guidelines, supra note 15, at 20; see also ADLER, supra note 103,
at 1.
105. As John Elliff explains, prior to 1976, preliminary inquiries were used 
recklessly, to the point where 
[i]n some cases, the FBI opened preliminary inquiries not only in response 
to allegations, but also as a means of screening all individuals in a suspect 
class. For example, the FBI opened preliminary inquiries about all black 
student leaders in 1971 to determine which of them belonged to groups 
like the Black Panther Party.
John T. Elliff, The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI Investigations, 69 
CORNELL L. REV. 785, 805 (1984) (citing S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. III, at 527 (1976)); 
see also S. REP. NO. 97-682 app. D at 504 (1983) (“[I]ndividuals and organizations 
should be free from law enforcement scrutiny that is undertaken without a valid 
factual predicate and without a valid law enforcement purpose.”).
106. Levi Guidelines, supra note 15, at 22 (emphasis added); see also
ADLER, supra note 103, at 9; Elliff, supra note 105, at 798.
107. Elliff, supra note 105, at 794.
108. Id. at 795.
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clear target or time frame controlling the investigation.109 By treating 
domestic security investigations like traditional criminal law 
enforcement investigations, the DOJ offered one more mechanism to 
limit the FBI’s domestic intelligence-gathering authority.
The impact of these changes was immediately felt. The number 
of FBI domestic security investigations decreased from 21,414 in 
July 1973 to 4,868 in March 1976.110
The Levi Guidelines were the perfect example of 
administrative constitutionalism at work. In the context of an active 
national dialogue, the Levi Guidelines issued a directive that put 
forth a new set of constitutional norms around government 
surveillance that responded to general concerns and specific 
problems, and, most importantly, provided an opportunity to test run 
solutions and experiment with new norms.111
Eskridge and Ferejohn find value in administrative 
constitutionalism because it facilitates a process of norm 
development and entrenchment that is gradual and iterative. As they 
describe, “normative commitments are announced and entrenched 
not through a process of Constitutional amendments or Supreme 
Court pronouncements but instead through the more gradual process 
of legislation, administrative implementation, public feedback, and 
legislative reaffirmation and elaboration.”112
109. Id.
110. OIG INVESTIGATION, supra note 100, at 38 (citing CHAIRMAN OF THE 
SUBCOMM. ON SEC. & TERRORISM, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., IMPACT OF ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS (THE LEVI 
GUIDELINES) 5 (Comm. Print 1984)).
111. There are alternate theories of the motivating intent of the Levi 
Guidelines. Some have described the Guidelines as “intended . . . to diminish the 
perceived need for legislation to regulate and restrict” FBI activity. United States v. 
Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 141, 190 (D. Mass. 1999); see also Emily Berman, 
Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014). Even accepting this as true, it does not cut against the central point of the 
Eskridge and Ferejohn theory of administrative constitutionalism: agencies, as norm 
entrepreneurs, should attempt to identify and implement emerging national 
consensus and, in doing so, begin the process of trial and error that will ultimately 
help locate the national consensus and articulate the rules that best reflect that 
position. Furthermore, such an alternate interpretation identifies a separate problem 
with administrative constitutionalism: agency action can be wielded to usurp 
political momentum and strategically avoid legislation, effectively securing 
administrative constitutionalism’s place in the shadows. If, in practice, legislative 
action is halted by agency intervention, the role of agencies as appropriate norm 
entrepreneurs is fundamentally called into question. Further exploration of this point 
is beyond the scope of this Paper, but I thank Aziz Huq for raising it.
112. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 9, at 14 (emphasis omitted).
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In this case, the Levi Guidelines were the first step in such an 
iterative process. They reflected an administrative agency responding 
to a national outcry by crafting regulations that reflected the findings 
and recommendations of a Congress that was in the process of 
developing legislation to regulate the domestic intelligence 
gathering. In many instances, the Levi Guidelines adopted legislative 
proposals that were under consideration, providing a laboratory-like 
environment in which to test out proposed solutions. This reflected 
Eskridge and Ferejohn’s idealized role of the agency, conforming 
their policy choices as “rationally consistent with the policy choices 
already made by a past Congress or likely to be acceptable to the 
current or a future one” given their position as unelected, 
unappointed actors in this dialogic process.113
It is from this high point of an administrative agency 
productively engaged in the constitutional process that we move to 
Part II, which details the subsequent history of the Attorney General 
Guidelines and the regrowth of domestic surveillance activities after 
1976.
II. SHADOW ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AT WORK
After the Levi Guidelines were issued, legislation both 
authorizing and regulating the FBI stalled, leaving the Attorney 
General Guidelines as the central source of governance for the 
FBI.114 Moreover, since the creation of the Levi Guidelines, there has 
been a steady unmooring of the Attorney General Guidelines from 
the rights-protecting framework enshrined in 1976. This unmooring 
suggests a weakness of administrative constitutionalism in practice: 
after the dust settles and our collective attention begins to fade, an 
agency shifts to shadow administrative constitutionalism. In this new 
phase, an agency continues to actively engage in norm 
entrepreneurship, but, instead of drawing from a national 
113. Id. at 16.
114. As Professor John Elliff explains in his excellent study of the early 
iterations of the Attorney General Guidelines:
In the absence of an explicit legislative charter, the FBI derives its 
statutory mandate primarily from the Attorney General’s authority to 
appoint officials: “(1) to detect and prosecute crimes against the United 
States; (2) to assist in the protection of the person of the President; and (3) 
to conduct such other investigations regarding official matters under the 
control of the Department of Justice and the Department of State as may 
be directed by the Attorney General.”
Elliff, supra note 105, at 786 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 533 (1976)).
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conversation to identify potential norms, an agency now draws from 
within the isolated echo chambers of the agency itself. 
From 1976 to date, there have been six notable developments 
to the Attorney General Guidelines under Attorneys General 
Civiletti, Smith, Thornburgh, Reno, Ashcroft, and Mukasey. Each 
iteration marks a slow, steady drift away from the substantive and 
procedural limitations placed on the domestic intelligence-gathering 
activities of the FBI. The result is that the hallmarks of the FBI are 
once again an unregulated expansion of its mission, the pursuit of its 
mission through illegal or potentially illegal means, and the creation 
of an intelligence-gathering process cloaked in secrecy.
A. The Reexpansion of the FBI’s Mission
Since the Levi Guidelines were first put in place, virtually 
every subsequent administration has revised the Guidelines. The first 
such change occurred under Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti 
in 1980.115
Under the Civiletti Guidelines, the term “criminal intelligence”
was created to serve a distinct investigative purpose from the FBI’s
general crimes investigations.116 Criminal intelligence applied to FBI 
investigations “undertaken to obtain information concerning 
enterprises which are engaged in racketeering activities involving 
violence, extortion or public corruption” and those “undertaken for 
the purpose of obtaining information on activities that threaten the 
national security.”117 Such criminal intelligence investigations stood 
apart from general crimes investigations, which were conducted to 
“detect, prevent[,] and prosecute specific violations of federal 
law.”118
The creation of a criminal intelligence authority expanded the 
FBI’s intelligence-gathering authority. Criminal intelligence 
investigations were broader in scope than general crimes 
investigations and could be authorized for indefinite time frames. As 
Professor Elliff explains:
[A]n investigation of a completed criminal act is normally confined to 
determining who committed that act and with securing evidence to 
establish the elements of the particular crime. . . . An investigation of an 
115. S. REP. NO. 97-682 app. D at 516 (1983).
116. Id. at 505.
117. Id.; see also Elliff, supra note 105, at 794.
118. S. REP. NO. 97-682 app. D at 505; see also Elliff, supra note 105, at 
794.
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ongoing criminal enterprise must determine the size and composition of 
the group involved, its geographic dimensions, its past acts and intended 
criminal goals, and its capacity for harm. . . . [T]he investigation of a 
criminal enterprise does not necessarily end, even though one or more of 
the participants may have been prosecuted.119
In 1983, under Attorney General William French Smith, the 
Guidelines expanded the primary role of the FBI to include domestic 
security as a separate mission, in addition to criminal law 
enforcement.120 Furthermore, the Smith Guidelines expanded the 
circumstances authorizing a domestic security investigation.
Specifically, under the Smith Guidelines, such an investigation was 
now authorized when “‘facts or circumstances [that] reasonably 
indicat[ed] that two or more persons [were] engaged in an enterprise 
for the purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly or in 
part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation 
of the criminal laws of the United States.’”121 This language 
authorized FBI investigations well in advance of any specific crime 
being contemplated, let alone committed. As Professor Elliff 
recounts, under these guidelines, “the threshold requirement was ‘not 
expressed . . . in terms of . . . probabilities or degrees of certainty that 
individuals or organizations are engaged or have engaged in crime’”;
rather, the standard simply required “‘a reasonable indication that the 
enterprise to be investigated is organized for the purpose of 
achieving its ends through criminal activity.’”122
119. Elliff, supra note 105, at 795 (quoting 125 CONG. REC. 21,395, 21,513 
(1979)).
120. WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND 
DOMESTIC SECURITY/TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS (1983) [hereinafter SMITH 
GUIDELINES]; OIG INVESTIGATION, supra note 100, at 47.
121. OIG INVESTIGATION, supra note 100, at 48 (quoting SMITH GUIDELINES,
supra note 120, § III.B.1.a); see also Elliff, supra note 105, at 798.
122. Elliff, supra note 105, at 799 (first alteration in original) (quoting Letter 
from Robert A. McConnell, Assistant Att’y Gen. for Legislative Affairs, to Senator 
Walter D. Huddleston (Apr. 7, 1983) (on file with Cornell Law Review)); see also 
SMITH GUIDELINES, supra note 120, § III.B.1.a. Elliff does not find so wide a gulf 
between the domestic terrorism investigations parameters under Attorneys General
Levi and Smith. He argues:
The differences between the political or social goals of criminal violence 
and the purposes for criminal violence enumerated in the Levi guidelines 
do not mean that the scope of investigations under the Smith guidelines is 
wider; the broadest purpose in the Levi guidelines was to investigate all 
individuals and groups that may be engaged in activities that involve or 
will involve the use of force or violence in violation of federal law for the 
purpose of “depriving persons of their civil rights.”
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The Smith Guidelines were drafted in part as a response to a 
hearing and study conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on 
Security and Terrorism in the early 1980s, which found the operative 
Guidelines to be unduly restrictive.123 The subcommittee concluded 
that the Guidelines should 
be revised to delete the criminal standard for initiating domestic security 
investigations; extend time limits for investigations, particularly those for 
preliminary and limited investigations; lower the evidentiary threshold for 
initiating limited investigations; relax restrictions on the recruitment and 
use of new informants; and authorize investigations of systematic 
advocacy of violence, alleged anarchists, or other activities calculated to 
weaken or undermine federal or state governments.124
In addition to recommending that “the revised Guidelines be 
tested and evaluated,” the Subcommittee recommended that the DOJ
“should thereafter ‘present legislative recommendations to Congress 
to justify the enactment into law of adequate and effective guidelines 
for domestic security investigations.’”125 Responding to this call, 
Attorney General Smith issued a revised, more aggressive set of 
Guidelines, intended “‘to ensure protection of the public from the 
greater sophistication and changing nature of domestic groups that 
are prone to violence.’”126
While this history might suggest the DOJ was operating in
active dialogue with Congress instead of in the shadows, I believe it 
provides, at most, a blip in the otherwise isolated process of norm 
entrepreneurship and entrenchment engaged in by the Department of 
Justice. Furthermore, unlike the Levi Guidelines, which were 
developed by an agency responding to the public and findings of a 
full-scale congressional investigation, the Smith Guidelines were 
developed in response to the recommendations of one subcommittee 
within one house of Congress. To the extent that agencies are to 
respond to the policy choices “already made by a past Congress or 
likely to be acceptable to the current or a future one,”127 the Smith 
Elliff, supra note 105, at 799 (footnote omitted) (quoting Levi Guidelines, supra 
note 15, at 20). However, I respectfully disagree for the reasons stated above.
123. OIG INVESTIGATION, supra note 100, at 46.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMM. ON SEC. & TERRORISM, 98TH 
CONG., 1ST SESS., IMPACT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC 
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS (THE LEVI GUIDELINES) 35 (Comm. Print 1984)).
126. Id. at 47 (quoting Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic Security 
Investigations (Smith Guidelines): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. & 
Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. app. A at 47 (1983)). 
127. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 9, at 16.
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Guidelines reflected an agency responding to a small segment of 
Congress, a segment that may well have been voicing a minority 
viewpoint.
The repositioning of the FBI as both a federal law enforcement 
agency as well as a domestic intelligence-gathering organization was 
thoroughly entrenched by 2002 when, in response to a country 
deeply shaken by the September 11 attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a 
new set of guidelines that made clear that “the prevention of terrorist 
acts became the central goal of the law enforcement and national 
security mission of the FBI.”128
Responding to what felt like an existential threat to the country, 
the Ashcroft Guidelines granted incredible power to the FBI. The 
Guidelines intended to “free the field agents . . . from the 
bureaucratic, organizational, and operational restrictions and 
structures that hindered them from doing their jobs effectively.”129
Without the benefit of public debate or congressional input on the 
way in which the FBI’s role needed to be expanded, Ashcroft 
unilaterally removed barriers that had previously “bar[red] FBI field 
agents from taking the initiative to detect and prevent future terrorist 
acts unless the FBI learns of possible criminal activity from external 
sources.”130 The conception of the FBI as a federal law enforcement 
agency was long gone, and in its place was an institution dedicated to 
the prevention of domestic terrorist attacks. 
The shift of the FBI’s mission from reactive criminal law 
enforcement to proactive terrorism prevention was affirmed, and 
explicitly stated, in 2008, when Attorney General Michael Mukasey 
issued Guidelines that provided the “latest step in moving beyond a 
reactive model (where agents must wait to receive leads before 
acting) to a model that emphasizes the early detection, intervention, 
and prevention of terrorist attacks and other criminal activities.”131
To implement this mission, the Mukasey Guidelines created a new 
type of inquiry, an Assessment, which, unlike all other previous 
investigative actions by the FBI, needs no factual predicate for its 
128. John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen. of the United States, Remarks on the 




131. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: Attorney General
Consolidated Guidelines for FBI Domestic Operations (Oct. 3, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/October/08-ag-889.html. 
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initiation.132 Assessments only require an authorized purpose: that 
they be “carried out to detect, obtain information about, or prevent or 
protect against federal crimes or threats to the national security or to 
collect foreign intelligence.”133 An FBI agent conducting an
Assessment can investigate any individual she chooses based solely 
on instinct so long as she is carrying out the Assessment in an effort 
to obtain information about past, present, or future federal crimes or 
a threat to national security. 
In the course of fifty years, the FBI reexpanded from an agency 
enforcing federal law to an agency protecting against all actual and 
unlikely threats to our national security. The reexpanded FBI mission 
is uncomfortably reminiscent of the seemingly endless purview of 
the FBI under Hoover’s tenure. 
B. The Reuse of Questionable Methods to Pursue the Mission
By the time the Smith Guidelines were issued in 1983, the 
FBI’s mandate was not the only thing that had morphed. The Smith 
Guidelines began to change the way FBI investigations were 
conducted, and the new methods that were authorized began to 
encroach on civil liberties. 
For example, the Smith Guidelines lowered the barrier for 
initiating a full investigation from one that required “specific and 
articulable facts” to one that merely required a “reasonable 
indication” of harm.134 The boundaries of reasonable indication are 
vague; it is less rigorous than the specific and articulable facts 
standard, but also requires more than “a mere hunch.”135 This lower 
standard was originally proposed in the FBI Charter Bill of 1979, a 
bill that was introduced and the subject of many hearings, but never 
made it out of committee.136 The Smith Guidelines, without 
132. MICHAEL B. MUKASEY, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI OPERATIONS 19 (2008) [hereinafter 
MUKASEY GUIDELINES], available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf.
133. Id.
134. See Levi Guidelines, supra note 15, at 22; SMITH GUIDELINES, supra
note 120, § II.C.1; see also OIG INVESTIGATION, supra note 100, at 48; Elliff, supra
note 105, at 799.
135. SMITH GUIDELINES, supra note 120, § II.C.1; cf. S. REP. NO. 97-682 app. 
D at 507 (1983).
136. FBI Charter Act of 1979: Hearing on S. 1612 Before the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 96th Cong., pt. 2, at 436-37 (1980); see also Elliff, supra note 105, at 
799.
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subjecting itself to the veto gates of the congressional process, 
ultimately adopted the very standard that was unable to garner the 
necessary votes to make it out of committee.
The Smith Guidelines also removed the distinction between 
“preliminary” and “limited” investigations and, in doing so, allowed 
the FBI to use the same techniques in all investigatory activities that 
did not qualify as full investigations. Thus, the facts and approvals 
necessary to begin a preliminary investigation were now sufficient to 
conduct a limited investigation with its attendant authorities.137
Additionally, unlike the Levi Guidelines, the Smith Guidelines
allowed FBI agents to attend religious gatherings and public political 
meetings undercover.138 In 1983, this authority was at least limited by 
two factors: first, undercover activity that threatened to influence the 
free exercise of First Amendment-protected rights needed approval 
from FBI Headquarters, and second, the FBI was required to notify 
the DOJ of such undercover activity.139 By 2003, as discussed in 
more detail later, these limitations were removed.140
Finally, the Smith Guidelines created a provision that 
authorized the FBI to investigate individuals based on statements that 
“advocate criminal activity.”141 Specifically, the provision provided 
that, “[i]n its efforts to anticipate or prevent crime, the FBI must at 
times initiate investigations in advance of criminal conduct.”142 The 
Guidelines acknowledged the provision’s encroachment on First 
Amendment-protected activity, though only prohibited investigations 
that were “based solely on activities protected by the First 
137. See SMITH GUIDELINES, supra note 120, § II.B.1; see also Allison Jones, 
The 2008 FBI Guidelines: Contradiction of Original Purpose, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
137, 145 (2009).
138. SMITH GUIDELINES, supra note 120, § IV.B.3; see also OIG
INVESTIGATION, supra note 100, at 49.
139. SMITH GUIDELINES, supra note 120, § IV.B.3; see also OIG
INVESTIGATION, supra note 100, at 49.
140. See infra notes 153-65 and accompanying text; JOHN ASHCROFT, OFFICE 
OF THE ATT’Y GEN., THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL CRIMES,
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND TERRORISM ENTERPRISE INVESTIGATION 22 (2002)
[hereinafter ASHCROFT GUIDELINES], available at
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/generalcrimes2.pdf; see also Memorandum 
from Marvin J. Johnson, Legislative Counsel, ACLU, Interested Persons Memo: 
Analysis of Changes to Attorney General Guidelines (June 6, 2002), available at
http://www.aclu.org/print/national-security/interested-persons-memo-analysis-
changes-attorney-general-guidelines.
141. SMITH GUIDELINES, supra note 120, § I.
142. Id.
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Amendment.”143 “[S]tatements advocat[ing] criminal activity or 
indicat[ing] an apparent intent to engage in crime, particularly crimes 
of violence,” would be sufficient to start an investigation unless it 
was clear that the statements in question did not present a prospect of 
harm.144 This language places the responsibility on the individual to 
make clear that her speech is within the protections of the First 
Amendment. 
In early 1988, five years after the Smith Guidelines were 
passed, it was discovered that, beginning in 1981, the FBI opened a 
criminal investigation of the Committee in Solidarity with the People 
of El Salvador (CISPES), a United States-based group that opposed 
the Reagan Administration’s policies in Central America.145 The 
discovery came when a long-time FBI informant alleged that the FBI 
broke into the Dallas headquarters of CISPES and “wiretapped its 
members’ phones and kept ‘terrorist’ files on almost 700 people, 
including two U.S. senators, a House member and a former 
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. Id. John Elliff provides a fascinating account of litigation that arose as a 
result of this provision. He writes: 
Shortly after issuance of the Smith guidelines, the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the new guidelines conflicted 
with a settlement reached in earlier litigation that established standards for 
FBI domestic security investigations in Chicago. The settlement had 
incorporated the Levi guidelines and stated that the FBI “‘shall not 
conduct an investigation solely on the basis of activities protected by the 
First Amendment.’” Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, the district court interpreted “activities protected by the First 
Amendment” as including advocacy that is not “‘directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and . . . likely to incite or produce such 
action.’” Concluding that the provision in the new guidelines authorizing 
investigation when “statements advocate criminal activity” permitted 
investigations that may not meet the Brandenburg test, the court enjoined 
implementation of the Smith guidelines within Chicago. The district court 
based its ruling on the terms of the 1981 settlement, not on a determination 
that the Smith guidelines were unconstitutional. The court expressed no 
opinion on the merits of the constitutional argument that an activity 
protected from criminal sanctions may not be protected from the “more 
limited” power to investigate.
Elliff, supra note 105, at 808-09 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted). The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision; however, the injunction was lifted as 
“unnecessary.” Id. at 809 (citing Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 733 
F.2d 1187, 1192 (7th Cir. 1984)).
145. See, e.g., Philip Shenon, F.B.I. Papers Show Wide Surveillance of 
Reagan Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1988, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/01/28/us/fbi-papers-show-wide-surveillance-of-
reagan-critics.html. 
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ambassador.”146 Congressional inquiries and investigative reports 
followed. The FBI’s own internal investigation showed that “the FBI 
had conducted an appropriate investigation for the initial period, but 
that its objectives became overly broad when FBI Headquarters 
directed all offices to treat each of the estimated 180 chapters of 
CISPES as subjects of the investigation.”147 The House Judiciary 
Committee’s report extended beyond just a review of the CISPES
incident and included a review of FBI investigative practices in 
general. The report found:
x [T]he FBI closed approximately 67 percent of its investigations 
because it did not develop evidence indicating that the subjects were 
engaging in international terrorist activities;
x United States citizens and permanent resident aliens were the subject 
of 38 percent of the 18,144 cases opened during January 1982-June 
1988;
x mosques were among the religious institutions targeted in the 1980s 
investigations; and
x the FBI monitored First Amendment-related activities in about 11.5 
percent of those cases; indexed information about individuals who 
were not subjects of FBI investigations in about 47.8 percent of the 
cases; and indexed information about groups which were not subjects 
of the investigations in about 11.6 percent of the cases.148
Despite these findings, no modifications on the FBI’s
investigatory methods and procedures were made. Emphasizing both 
how increasingly detached from and immune to public outcry the 
FBI had become, the CISPES scandal did not catalyze any 
significant change to the Attorney General Guidelines governing the 
FBI.149 Instead, the Guidelines issued in March 1989 were minor and 
dealt largely with approval authority for preliminary inquiries.150
146. Eric Pianin, U.S. Behind Break-Ins, Sanctuary Leaders Testify, WASH.
POST, Feb. 20, 1987, at A27. 
147. OIG INVESTIGATION, supra note 100, at 51.
148. Id. at 53-54. For more information, see U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/GGD-90-112, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: FBI INVESTIGATES DOMESTIC 
ACTIVITIES TO IDENTIFY TERRORISTS app. I at 28-30 (1990), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/150/149691.pdf.
149. If press reports are any indication, there was significant public pressure 
to reform intelligence activity after the CISPES scandal. See, e.g., Charles R. 
Babcock, FBI Surveillance of Policy Critics Alleged, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1987, at 
A34; Philip Shenon, F.B.I.’s Chief Says Surveillance Was Justified, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 3, 1988, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/03/us/fbi-s-chief-
says-surveillance-was-justified.html; Sanford J. Ungar, The F.B.I. on the Defensive 
Again, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 1988),
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The next update to the FBI’s investigative methods came with 
Attorney General Reno. Instead of additional substantive changes, 
the Reno Guidelines further entrenched existing standards. After
both the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center and the 1995 attack 
on the Alfred P. Murrah federal building, FBI capability to detect 
and prevent acts of terrorism came under fire. 
As a result, in November 1995 the Reno Guidelines were 
issued which, while maintaining the general language around 
investigatory methods, provided a more detailed interpretation of the 
existing Guidelines, emphasizing that the “‘reasonable indication’
standard for opening a full investigation is ‘substantially lower than 
probable cause’ and that a preliminary investigation could be opened 
on a lesser showing.”151
The next set of major changes came in response to the 
September 11 attacks and further lowered barriers to begin 
investigations. Attorney General Ashcroft explained:
“Under the current guidelines, FBI investigators cannot surf the web the 
way you or I can. Nor can they simply walk into a public event or a public 
place to observe ongoing activities. They have no clear authority to use 
commercial data services that any business in America can use. These 
restrictions are a competitive advantage for terrorists who skillfully utilize 
sophisticated techniques and modern computer systems to compile 
information for targeting and attacking innocent Americans.”152
To address this frustration and make intelligence gathering easier 
more generally, the Ashcroft Guidelines instituted four significant 
changes. 
First, as mentioned earlier, the Ashcroft Guidelines authorized 
the FBI to engage in surveillance of public gatherings and meetings 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/05/15/magazine/the-fbi-on-the-defensive-once-
again.html.
150. OIG INVESTIGATION, supra note 100, at 53 n.135.
151. Id. at 56 (quoting a memorandum circulated to FBI field offices).
152. Id. at 188-89 (quoting Ashcroft, supra note 128). Ashcroft’s claims 
were not entirely accurate; the FBI was authorized to do all three of those activities 
pursuant to an ongoing investigation, as Ashcroft himself noted in later testimony in 
front of the Senate Judiciary Committee. There he explained that the FBI was 
authorized to engage in the aforementioned activities so long as it was pursuant to an 
existing criminal investigation. Oversight of the Dept. of Justice: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of John Ashcroft, Att’y 
Gen. of the United States), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_hr/072502ashcroft.html; cf. supra note 126
and accompanying text. 
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without any checks or balances.153 While the Smith Guidelines 
already allowed “‘undisclosed participation in the activities of an 
organization by an undercover employee or cooperating private 
individual in a manner that may influence the exercise of rights 
protected by the First Amendment,’”154 such surveillance required 
approval. In particular, before agents were authorized to 
surreptitiously attend religious gatherings or associational meetings, 
they needed approval from FBI headquarters and the DOJ.155 Under 
the Ashcroft Guidelines, authorization from FBI Headquarters was 
no longer needed, and the DOJ was no longer notified. Instead, the 
FBI was given blanket authority “to visit any place and attend any 
event that is open to the public, on the same terms and conditions as 
members of the public generally,” as long as they enter said place 
“[f]or the purpose of detecting or preventing terrorist 
activities.”156 As the ACLU noted at the time, this rationale sounds 
uncomfortably similar to the rationale used by the FBI in order to 
send “agents into churches and other organizations during the civil 
rights movement . . . to block the movement, suppress dissent, and 
protect the administration.”157
153. See supra note 140 and accompanying text; see also infra Subsection
VI.A.2.
154. OIG INVESTIGATION, supra note 100, at 49 (quoting SMITH GUIDELINES,
supra note 120, § IV.B.3).
155. SMITH GUIDELINES, supra note 120, § IV.B.3.
156. ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 140, at 22. Part VI “explicitly 
authorizes the FBI to visit public places and attend public events on the same terms 
and conditions as members of the public for the purpose of detecting or preventing 
terrorist activities.” OIG INVESTIGATION, supra note 100, at 11. Originally, under the 
Levi Guidelines, “the FBI’s authority to engage in these activities generally was 
interpreted to be limited to the investigation of crimes or the collection of criminal 
intelligence only when agents had a sufficient evidentiary basis to check leads, 
conduct a preliminary inquiry, or conduct a full investigation.” Id.
157. Memorandum from Marvin J. Johnson, supra note 140. Interestingly, a 
request for this type of information was made earlier in the FBI’s history, but at that 
time, to no avail. In 1982, FBI Director William H. Webster expressed frustration 
with having to conform to the data-gathering provisions of the recently passed 
Privacy Act of 1974. He complained of the agency’s “inability to review periodicals 
or other publications of organizations that are not under investigation,” a limitation 
that prohibits agencies from collecting and maintaining records on how individuals
or organizations exercise their First Amendment rights unless it pertains to an active 
investigation. Domestic Security (Levi) Guidelines: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Sec. & Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 12 (1983)
(statement of William H. Webster, Director, FBI). As a result, Webster sounded the 
call, to be repeated often until Ashcroft successfully changed the rules, that “it
makes little sense to deny us information that is available to the general public.” Id.
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Second, the Ashcroft Guidelines authorized the FBI to 
purchase detailed profiles compiled by data mining companies 
without any evidence supporting suspicion.158 Under these rules, the 
government is privy to information compiled “[a]ny time you write 
check [sic], use a credit card, buy something on credit, make 
department store purchases, surf the Web, use an e-z pass to buy 
gasoline or pay a toll,” because those activities are gathered by 
commercial database companies, and, under the Ashcroft Guidelines, 
those databases could be subject to government inspection.159 In 
addition to being able to acquire profiles of U.S. persons, the FBI
gained authority to store this information for future investigatory 
purposes indefinitely.160 This raises concerns because data mining 
services often have inaccurate data from which the FBI can draw 
inaccurate conclusions161 and also because some data mining services 
profile people by race and religion, a feature which could lend itself 
to systematic racial and religious profiling by the FBI.162
Third, the Ashcroft Guidelines doubled the period for the initial 
authorization to conduct investigations from ninety to 180 days, 
allowed Special Agents in Charge, instead of FBI Headquarters, to 
grant the first two extensions of time for preliminary inquiries, and 
lengthened the duration of these extensions from thirty to ninety
days.163 These changes were described by the ACLU as “open 
158. ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 140, at 21.
159. ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 140, at 21; Memorandum from 
Marvin J. Johnson, supra note 140.
160. ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 140, at 21. Though the Privacy Act 
of 1974 limits the time for which government agencies can keep documents, it also 
contains very large exceptions. The Act’s “General Exemptions” provision, for 
example, includes “information compiled for the purpose of a criminal 
investigation.” 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(2)(B) (2006).
161. The Privacy Act also provides a mechanism through which individuals 
can correct inaccurate information, but, again, the FBI’s data is likely exempted 
from those requirements. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d); see also Anya Bernstein, The Hidden 
Costs of Terrorist Watch Lists, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 461, 467-68 (2013).
162. See, e.g., Spencer Ackerman, FBI Crime Maps Now ‘Pinpoint’ Average 
Muslims, WIRED: DANGER ROOM BLOG (Oct. 24, 2011, 1:30 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/10/fbi-geomaps-muslims (reporting that 
“the FBI compiles maps of businesses, community centers and religious institutions 
in ethnic enclaves around the United States,” and specifically in Muslim 
neighborhoods, with no connection to the investigation of suspected criminal 
activity); see also Mapping the FBI: Uncovering Abusive Surveillance and Racial 
Profiling, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/mapping-fbi-uncovering-abusive-
surveillance-and-racial-profiling (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
163. ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 140, at 8-9; see also OIG
INVESTIGATION, supra note 100, at 171.
Shadow Administrative Constitutionalism 95
invitations for fishing expeditions” that would allow the FBI to “spy 
on citizens and noncitizens, and gather political intelligence for up to 
one year with no oversight from FBI Headquarters.”164
Fourth, information gathered during a preliminary inquiry was 
to be maintained in a database in order to facilitate “the prompt 
retrieval of information concerning the status (open or closed) and 
subjects of all such inquiries and investigations.”165 Such a decision
raises due process concerns arising from the placement of individuals 
within a government database without their knowledge and without 
verification of the facts contained therein.166 Additionally, the 
aggregation of highly personal and identifying information into one 
central database becomes a “honeypot” for hackers and criminals.167
Finally, and more to the core of the problem, a government database 
on American activity creates distrust between law enforcement 
officials and the public, threatening the very safety that the FBI is 
charged with preserving.168
The final significant update occurred with the 2008 Mukasey 
Guidelines, which, as discussed earlier, created an “Assessment”
level of investigation. The Assessment category granted FBI agents a 
vast amount of investigatory authority premised on no factual 
evidence whatsoever.169 Conducting an Assessment allowed FBI 
agents to:
164. Memorandum from Marvin J. Johnson, supra note 140; see also 
ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 140, at 21.
165. ASHCROFT GUIDELINES, supra note 140, at 21.
166. See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 161, at 462; Peter M. Shane, The 
Bureaucratic Due Process of Government Watch Lists, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 804, 
837-54 (2007).
167. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of 
Privacy Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 392.
168. See, e.g., Hubert Williams, Police Found., Foreword to ANITA KHASHU,
POLICE FOUND., THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE: STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, at vii-viii (2009), available at
http://www.policefoundation.org/sites/g/files/g798246/f/Khashu%20%282009%29
% 20-%20The%20Role%20of%20Local%20Police.pdf.
169. MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 132, at 19-20; see also Charlie 
Savage, Wider Authority for F.B.I. Agents Stirs Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2009,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/29/us/29manual.html (“The 
manual authorizes agents to open an ‘assessment’ to ‘proactively’ seek information 
about whether people or organizations are involved in national security threats. 
Agents may begin such assessments against a target without a particular factual 
justification. The basis for such an inquiry ‘cannot be arbitrary or groundless 
speculation,’ the manual says, but the standard is ‘difficult to define.’” (quoting FBI,
DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE 39-40 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 
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a. Obtain publicly available information. 
b. Access and examine FBI and other Department of Justice records, 
and obtain information from any FBI or other Department of Justice 
personnel.
c. Access and examine records maintained by, and request information 
from, other federal, state, local, or tribal, or foreign governmental 
entities or agencies. 
d. Use online services and resources (whether nonprofit or commercial). 
e. Use and recruit human sources in conformity with the Attorney 
General’s Guidelines Regarding the Use of FBI Confidential Human 
Sources. 
f. Interview or request information from members of the public and 
private entities. 
g. Accept information voluntarily provided by governmental or private 
entities. 
h. Engage in observation or surveillance not requiring a court order.
i. [Obtain] [g]rand jury subpoenas for telephone or electronic mail 
subscriber information.170
Interestingly, the Assessment level of investigatory authority was 
adopted from an earlier set of guidelines that governed foreign
intelligence collection, illustrating how the comparatively lower 
standards that govern foreign intelligence gathering are being 
imported and applied to domestic intelligence gathering.171
As this Section illustrates, to meet the expanding mission of the 
FBI, the Attorney General Guidelines expanded the investigatory 
tools available to the FBI, often in questionable ways. In particular, 
evolution of the Guidelines shifted the balance originally struck 
between civil liberties and national security interests by allowing 
more incursions on rights with comparably fewer facts supporting a 
national security need. 
DIOG], available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/images/nytint/docs/the-
new-operations-manual-from-the-f-b-i/original.pdf)). 
170. MUKASEY GUIDELINES, supra note 132, at 20. This creates the layered 
approach to creating legitimacy in law. Currently, ECPA allows this and it has come 
under fire. By creating a provision reemphasizing this authority, the FBI further 
lends legitimacy to an authority that was previously seen as anomalous and 
controversial.
171. JOHN ASHCROFT, OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR FBI NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION 19-23 (2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/nsiguidelines.pdf.
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C. The Recreation of an Intelligence-Gathering Process Cloaked in 
Secrecy
The third hallmark of the Hoover FBI was secrecy, and we are 
now experiencing a similar veil of secrecy over the government’s
domestic intelligence program. 
The Attorney General Guidelines are developed behind closed 
doors, without consulting Congress or the public. Recently, it has 
been discovered that the FBI, also without consultation with 
Congress or the public, develops and issues a dense internal manual 
called the Domestic Investigation and Operations Guide (DIOG), 
which, by one account “supposedly narrows but in fact expands the 
Attorney General Guidelines.”172 The DIOG is, as the FBI openly 
states, a “policy document”173 in which the Bureau “implement[s]”
the Attorney General Guidelines on its own accord, without any 
formal oversight.174 In this way, the DIOG is a playbook for the FBI, 
by the FBI. The FBI found itself in hot water as a result of the 2008 
iteration of the DIOG because it authorized a program of “race-and-
ethnicity-based profiling.”175 Specifically, the DIOG authorized FBI 
agents 
to collect and analyze racial and ethnic demographic information to 
identify and “Geo-map” concentrated ethnic communities and the location 
of ethnic oriented businesses and facilities “if these locations will 
reasonably aid in the analysis of potential threats and vulnerabilities” and 
assist in “intelligence analysis.” The DIOG also allows the FBI to collect 
and track “specific and relevant ethnic behavior” and “behavioral 
172. Telephone Interview with Michael German, ACLU Policy Counsel &
Former FBI Agent (Feb. 12, 2013). 






174. FBI Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide (DIOG), FBI,
http://vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20
Guide%20%28DIOG%29 (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). The first DIOG was issued 
on December 16, 2008, and an updated version was issued on October 15, 2011. Id.
For a copy of the 2008 document, see 2008 DIOG, supra note 169.
175. Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Dir., ACLU, to Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y 
Gen. of the U.S. 3 (Oct. 20, 2011), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/aclu_letter_to_ag_re_rm_102011_0.pdf. 
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characteristics reasonably associated with a particular criminal or terrorist 
element of an ethnic community.”176
Perhaps more astounding than the program, is the fact that, though it 
was authorized in 2008, it was not discovered until 2011.177 And 
even then, it was only discovered thanks to the diligent efforts of the 
advocacy organizations that litigated to learn of both the existence 
and the facts of the program.178
Furthermore, the DIOG has created an unprecedented new 
level of investigative authority, the “pre-assessment” investigation
authority, which allows agents to conduct certain investigations 
without making any record of it. Despite a recent report that showed 
that the FBI conducted 82,325 assessments on individuals and 
groups from March 2009 to March 2011,179 FBI General Counsel, 
Valerie Caproni, said that it was “too cumbersome to require agents 
to open formal inquiries before running quick checks.”180 As a result, 
the FBI relaxed requirements on conducting investigations by
removing the requirement of even needing to open an assessment 
before searching for information about a person in a commercial or 
law enforcement database.181 Under the new rules, “agents will be 
allowed to search such databases without making a record about their 
decision,” thus leaving no paper trail and making it even harder to 
track and account for government intelligence gathering of 
Americans.182
From the moment the Levi Guidelines were issued, the 
historical account provided above demonstrates how the DOJ began 
the slow process of reversion back to old habits. As our collective 
attention to surveillance and intelligence gathering began to fade, the 
DOJ was caught in a period of “drift”—a time where it slowly 
retreated back to old positions. This points to a weakness of 
administrative constitutionalism: when people are no longer laser 
focused on redefining the abstract moral language of our 
176. Id. (quoting 2008 DIOG, supra note 169, at 32-33).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 4.
179. Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Focusing on Security over Ordinary Crime, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2011, at A16, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/24/us/24fbi.html. 
180. Charlie Savage, F.B.I. Agents Get Leeway to Push Privacy Bounds,
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Constitution, agencies can enter a quiet, solitary process of shadow 
administrative constitutionalism. 
The Attorney General Guidelines were originally drafted to 
articulate and implement the tentative consensus that emerged from a 
national dialogue. In this way, the 1976 iteration of the Guidelines 
demonstrated administrative constitutionalism at work. However, 
instead of iterating those norms through a robust interbranch, 
intrabranch, and public dialogue, the Guidelines were iterated 
internally, drawing inspiration from the isolated echo chambers of 
the DOJ itself. Over time, the evolution of the norms espoused by the 
Guidelines shifted the balance between individual rights and national 
security. Those norms soon became entrenched, without undergoing 
the deliberation that is assumed within administrative 
constitutionalism. This evolution reflects shadow administrative 
constitutionalism at work. 
As this Part demonstrates, in the midst of a national 
conversation, administrative agencies can be valuable vehicles for 
articulating, implementing, and refining the emerging national 
consensus. However, when the conversation comes to an end, 
agencies may continue to develop norms with no anchor in public 
discourse and no promise of public deliberation. Parts III and IV take 
a step back to explore why the Attorney General Guidelines evolved 
the way they did. 
III. NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE SHADOWS: THE NATURAL 
IMPULSE TOWARDS MISSION CREEP
Why is it that the evolution of the Attorney General Guidelines 
systematically promoted norms that prioritized national security over 
civil liberties and expanded the FBI’s authority? In this Part, I argue 
that this phenomenon is the result of the agency’s natural impulse 
towards mission creep. This instinct is a function of two separate 
conditions both operating in the national security arena: a powerful 
and loosely defined mandate—preserving our national security—and 
the medieval structure of bureaucracy. These factors encouraged the 
creation of policies that rejiggered the balance between civil rights 
and national security needs in favor of national security. 
A. Powerful, Loosely Defined Mandate
The mission of national security is at once so powerful and so 
vague that mission creep towards complete surveillance is only 
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natural. After all, it is a Hobbesian reminder of the primary purpose 
of the state. The state exists to keep us safe from each other and from 
outsiders. If the citizenry cannot rest assured that their possessions, 
livelihoods, and lives are stable and secure, then the state has failed 
in its most fundamental duty. At the highest level, this mandate 
contains no limiting principles, and the determination of when our 
national security is threatened is solely in the hands of the executive 
charged with delivering on the mandate. Thus, while we may 
negotiate peacetime limitations on the authorities of law enforcement 
and intelligence gathering, when the security of the nation is called 
into question, those limitations are easily shrugged off and the 
mission expanded. 
As existential threats to our national security increasingly 
become a way of life, the FBI is instinctively responding by 
expanding its mission and pursuing its mission more 
comprehensively. As Professor Peter Swire explains: 
[A] more general reason why surveillance powers expand over time [is 
that] intelligence agencies get part of a picture but are unable to 
understand the entire picture and thus seek and receive additional powers, 
with the hopes that the additional surveillance capabilities will be more 
effective at meeting the goal of preventing harm before it occurs.183
Thus it is in part the noble pursuit of a powerful but amorphous
mandate that motivates mission creep.
The powerful and loosely defined mission also encourages 
mission creep in an attempt to avoid the public inquiry and blame
game that often occur in the wake of an attack. Consider the response
to the Boston Marathon bombing in 2013. The FBI was widely 
blamed for not keeping better tabs on one of the accused bombers, 
Tamerlan Tsarnaev, a legal, permanent resident of the United States. 
In early 2011, the FBI received a tip from the Russian government 
that Tsarnaev was growing increasingly radicalized in his practice of 
Islam.184 In response, the FBI “checked U.S. government databases 
and other information to look for such things as derogatory telephone 
communications, possible use of online sites associated with the 
promotion of radical activity, associations with other persons of 
183. Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1349 (2004); see also David S. Kris, Law Enforcement as 
a Counterterrorism Tool, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2011).
184. Scott Shane & Michael S. Schmidt, F.B.I. Did Not Tell Police in Boston 
of Russian Tip, N.Y. TIMES (May 10, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/10/us/boston-police-werent-told-fbi-got-warning-
on-tsarnaev.html. 
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interest, travel history and plans, and education history,” in addition 
to interviewing Tsarnaev’s family members.185 The investigation 
produced little actionable evidence. The FBI shared the information 
with Russian authorities and asked for additional information on 
Tsarnaev that might justify further investigation, but did not receive 
any information.186
Despite the fact that the FBI followed protocol, the public and 
the press fixated on the fact that the FBI was aware of Tsarnaev’s
radicalization and yet did not prevent the attack in Boston.187 The 
public’s fear that the attacks represented a failure of the FBI was not 
allayed by the President’s assurances that the FBI managed the 
situation with the utmost competence, both pre- and post-attack.188 In 
a moment of fear, the public demanded 100% prevention, ignoring 
the fact that perfect prevention is difficult in a society that also 
protects civil liberties.189
This post-attack blame game forces the Justice Department and 
the FBI to make a difficult decision: Do they aggressively and 
potentially unconstitutionally expand their vague mandate to include 
the prevention of all instances of terrorism-related violence, or do 
they maintain a conservative interpretation of their authority and risk 
exposing the agency to intense public scrutiny and potentially having 
the agency brass raked over the coals, regardless of whether or not 
the FBI or any other element of DOJ was at fault? A reasonable 
agency head would choose to expand the mandate. After all, as I 
discuss more fully in Parts IV and V, given the secrecy in which 
national security policy is made and the sparse oversight to which it 
is subject, the minimal chance of any exposure of inappropriate or 
illegal practices is outweighed by the benefits of expanding the 
mandate. 
185. Press Release, FBI Nat’l Press Office, 2011 Request for Information on 




187. Shane & Schmidt, supra note 184.
188. See id.
189. This obsession with terrorism prevention exists despite the fact that 
incidents of domestic terrorism are lower today than they were before 9/11. As 
recently reported by Elizabeth Goitein and Faiza Patel, “In the 1970s, for example, 
the U.S. saw an average of 60 to 70 terrorist incidents a year, which is 15 to 20 times 
higher than the level of terrorist activity seen in most years since 9/11.” Elizabeth
Goitein & Faiza Patel, Rethinking the War on Terror, BOS. REV. (May 28, 2013),
http://bostonreview.net/us/rethinking-war-terror.
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Given the powerful and loosely defined national security 
mandate, it is only natural that the FBI’s mission creeps from 
investigating crimes to preventing crime. This expansive 
interpretation of the mandate encourages aggressive surveillance 
norms. In this way, the FBI’s instinctive promotion of surveillance 
norms is inevitable. 
B. Medieval Structure of Bureaucracy
The proclivity toward mission creep is compounded by a 
general bureaucratic inclination towards mission creep. 
Bureaucracies tend to operate as fiefdoms—collecting and holding 
onto as much power as possible, limiting external oversight of their 
work, and allowing it only ex post.190 Some scholars, including Daryl 
Levinson, have questioned this theory, arguing that the “bureaucrats’
commitment to a particular mission, or to a particular vision of how 
that mission ought to be accomplished, might cause them to resist 
any expansion of agency activity outside of these boundaries.”191
Levinson further argues that agency heads are “high-level political 
appointees who will be much less invested in the agency’s mission 
and much more interested in pleasing their political overseers”—
individuals who likely have no reason to prioritize the expansion of 
bureaucracy.192 Such arguments underestimate the natural instincts of 
individuals to believe that what they are doing is good and useful and 
therefore that doing more of it is likely better. Furthermore, such 
arguments assume that agency officials are so politically tied to their 
“overseers” that they will abandon any desire to create a separate 
professional legacy of their own. 
Together, the nature of bureaucracy and the powerful and 
loosely defined national security mandate provide one rationale for 
the evolution of the norms embedded within the Attorney General 
Guidelines. The next Part of this Article attempts to unpack the 
conditions that support the entrenchment of those norms into our 
culture.
190. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 633, 700, 703 (2000) (describing the politicized bureaucracy as an “unruly . 
. . fiefdom[]”). See generally WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989).
191. Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law,
118 HARV. L. REV. 915, 933 (2005).
192. Id.
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IV. NORM ENTRENCHMENT IN THE SHADOWS: THE UNWITTING 
ACCEPTANCE OF AGENCY NORMS INTO CULTURE AND LAW
Norms are traditionally studied in legal scholarship to the 
extent that they “control individual behavior to the exclusion of law,”
interact with the law such that they “together influence behavior,”
influence the development of law, or reflect the influence of law.193
This Article provides an account of the way in which an 
administrative agency, through what has been termed “soft law,”194 is 
able to influence cultural norms on a given issue, which over time 
influences the development of hard law in the area. Alternately 
stated, this Article offers one “theory of origin” for our current pro-
surveillance norms and laws in an effort to “help identify the 
conditions under which . . . [these] norms are likely to arise, 
conditions which may signal the need for legal intervention.”195
It is understood that laws can shape societal norms.196 As 
McAdams describes, “Various scholars claim that legally restricting 
193. See McAdams, supra note 11, at 347.
194. Jacob Gersen and Eric Posner have described “soft law” as those 
“statements by lawmaking authorities that do not have the force of law (most often 
because they do not comply with relevant formalities or for other reasons are not 
regarded as legally binding), but nonetheless affect the behavior of others.” Jacob E. 
Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 573, 577 (2008) (footnote omitted). While defined broadly, soft law is 
traditionally studied more narrowly in the context of regulators coercing regulated
entities by publicly signaling a threat or promise of tougher or more rigid regulations 
if certain behaviors are not “voluntarily” adopted. See, e.g., David Zaring, Best 
Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 297 (2006) (detailing agencies’ use of the “best 
practices” model of regulation in which “regulated entities themselves devise 
practices to comply with relatively unspecific regulatory requirements. These 
practices are selected and publicized as ‘best,’ but not mandated by central 
administrators as they would be in regulation through a more traditional vertical 
command-and-control model. The idea is that these best practices will subsequently 
be adopted by other regulated entities”). This Article discusses a variant of this 
traditional notion of soft law. In particular, the focus here is on an agency exercising 
soft law not to coerce certain behaviors, but instead, to pressure test certain ideas 
with the public and in some cases, perhaps, to introduce and acclimatize the public 
to a new norm. Upon the successful socialization of a new “norm,” so marked by the 
general public acceptance of it, the path is now clear for a hard law to be passed if 
deemed necessary or so desired.
195. McAdams, supra note 11, at 391.
196. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 11, at 349; Lawrence Lessig, The 
Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 968-72, 1019-25 (1995); see 
also Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905-
07 (1996) (using norms to explain changes in smoking behavior, recycling patterns, 
and gender roles in America).
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public smoking may strengthen an antismoking norm, that Title VII 
impedes enforcement of undesirable norms of race discrimination, 
and that bans on dueling worked to end norms obligating the duel.”197
Using the same logic, it is no surprise that soft law can also 
contribute to the way in which societal norms develop. 
However, there are certain dangers with the use of soft law. 
Soft law is developed through a more implicit process, and therefore, 
lacks the democratic features that are hallmarks of the “hard law”
process. As Gersen and Posner explain, “A central tenet of the rule 
of law is that law be public, so that people may debate it, object to it, 
and plan their lives around it. Secret law is an anathema and perhaps 
soft law resembles secret law.”198 Without discounting the utility of 
soft law in certain circumstances, this Part argues that soft law can 
have dangerous repercussions when it is used to identify something 
as complex and core to our democracy as the appropriate balance 
between privacy and national security because of the impact it allows 
the government to have on our cultural norms.199
As Eskridge and Ferejohn note, the legitimacy of 
administrative constitutionalism is based on the expectation that 
entrenchment involves public deliberation, . . . the deliberation involves 
several institutions cooperating together as well as protecting their own 
authority[,] . . . entrenching deliberation occurs over a long period of time, 
and the norm does not stick in our public culture until former opponents 
agree that the norm is a good one (or at least an acceptable idea).200
However, as this Part argues, norm entrepreneurship by 
administrative agencies can result in norm entrenchment even if the 
intervening deliberation does not occur through the process of 
shadow administrative constitutionalism. In this Part, I explore this 
alternate process of norm entrenchment and its implications on 
culture and law.
197. McAdams, supra note 11, at 349 (footnotes omitted).
198. Gersen & Posner, supra note 194, at 597.
199. By comparison, the use of soft law to identify “best practices for 
protection and security of ‘high-value installations’ such as airports, harbors, nuclear 
power facilities, and military bases[,] . . . best practices in getting Hispanics to wear 
seat belts,” or best practices for “designing workplace policies that would allow 
disabled individuals to telecommute most effectively” seem inherently less 
problematic. For these examples and others, see Zaring, supra note 194, at 296-97.
200. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 9, at 7. 
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A. How Entrenchment Happens
In shadow administrative constitutionalism, norm entrenchment 
is the product of the public’s tacit acceptance of bureaucratic 
policymaking as wise or at least intractable. It is norm entrenchment 
motivated by path dependency201 and legitimated by historical 
practice. 
Path dependency reflects an understanding of the relative cost 
associated with changing course.202 As President Obama realized in 
his first term, change requires much more than the support of the 
electorate.203 It also requires political will and political capital.204 Path 
dependency captures the instincts of government officials to opt for 
the path of least resistance—to pick their political battles wisely. 
Even if the spirit of Edward Levi suddenly overtook the DOJ,
the battle to reverse course would be a difficult one. As a first-order 
matter, changing course implies that the existing course is 
incorrect—an admission of failure that might expose the agency to 
unwanted scrutiny and negatively implicate the agency’s top brass. 
Secondly, political support on this issue is not evenly distributed. 
Though the agency could rely on underrepresented and underfunded 
activist groups to support a reversion to the previous surveillance
norms, the agency would be wise to expect opposition from the 
powerful defense contractor lobby and the national security war 
hawks that would argue that the country’s security was compromised 
as a consequence. 
201. For a broader discussion of path dependency in law and politics, see
generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern 
of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001); Paul 
Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 251 (2000); Richard A. Posner, Past-Dependency, Pragmatism, and
Critique of History in Adjudication and Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 
(2000).
202. See Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 
CALIF. L. REV. 887, 908 (2012) (“[A]s an agency invests in expertise and turf 
battles, it becomes more set in its ways and hence more reluctant to reorient toward 
new problems and to respond to new policy challenges.”).
203. See Matt Viser, Still Talking About Change in a Time of Broken 
Politics, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2013, at A1, available at
http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/01/20/president-obama-will-use-
first-term-lessons-and-campaign-tactics-tackle-challenges-next-four-
years/zjys4IsoEhJH9gbTtS2AFP/story.html (citing Obama’s official Jim Messina as 
stating, “‘One thing we learned in the first term, especially the first two years, was it 
became a very inside Washington game to pass these things’”).
204. See id.
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The second mechanism that creates entrenchment is historical 
practice. Over time, the norms adopted through path dependency 
become accepted as correct. A given historical practice gains 
legitimacy under the belief that what is time-tested is true. However, 
such a belief assumes that time has offered its fair share of critics and 
that only those things that are sturdy enough to withstand the assault 
of those critics earn the title of “time-tested and true.” The evolution 
of the Guidelines can be understood to demonstrate that such an 
assumption is not always deserved. Rather, the Guidelines show us 
that entrenchment can simply be the product of slow movements in 
one direction building upon each other, each additional movement 
unfairly affirming the directional accuracy of the one before it. By 
the time we are miles to the right of where we started, we feel as if 
this new place is correct simply because, if it were not, surely 
someone would have stopped us earlier. Thus, norm entrenchment 
that results from historical practice assumes deliberation or, at the 
very least, assumes our implicit collective consent to the norm itself, 
evidenced, circularly, by the continued operation of the norm. 
Putting it all together, the norm entrepreneurship that began 
after the passage of the Levi Guidelines combined with the proclivity
towards path-dependency created a one-way ratchet for surveillance 
authority, where the size of each shift was a factor of the priorities 
and temperament of the President, his Attorney General, and his FBI 
Director. The norms introduced are ultimately deemed appropriate 
by virtue of the wisdom of historical practice. The next Section 
discusses the implication of the entrenchment of these surveillance 
norms. 
B. Surveillance Culture
Under this theory of shadow administrative constitutionalism,
over time, an agency can, unwittingly, influence and shift our 
collective sense of normal. The balance between free speech and 
national security was quietly but progressively shifted through the 
various iterations of the Attorney General Guidelines. Without public 
awareness, let alone public deliberation, the new balance has become 
one that we have come to accept as correct. That surveillance is 
increasingly commonplace today and that people understand this not 
as a violation of their rights but as a small price to pay for security—
this is the consequence of shadow administrative constitutionalism.
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Consider FISA. The basic structure of FISA remained 
unchanged from 1978 until September 11, 2001.205 In response to 
9/11, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by 
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism of 2001 (the PATRIOT Act), which revised FISA to make 
it easier to gather intelligence information, despite the impact that
that easing had on Americans’ civil liberties.206
The PATRIOT Act tore down the “wall” separating foreign 
intelligence activities from domestic law enforcement,207 created 
authority for a roving wiretap,208 and authorized more expansive 
access to private business records.209 The changes resulting from the 
PATRIOT Act were immediately felt. “In 2003, for the first time, the 
number of surveillance orders issued under FISA exceeded the 
number of law enforcement wiretaps issued nationwide.”210
Because the PATRIOT Act was rushed through Congress in 
what was a state of emergency, many of the Act’s more aggressive 
provisions, including the FISA provisions, were scheduled to sunset 
on December 31, 2005.211 However, when the time came for sunset, 
after significant debate, the PATRIOT Act was renewed.212
Reflecting the high tensions during the debate, “[s]ome lawmakers 
who voted for the bill expressed deep reservations about it, and the 
Republican chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee [had] 
already [begun] drafting further legislation to revise it.”213 Tensions 
ultimately subsided, however, and no such legislation was passed.
Instead, in 2008, a new law, the FISA Amendments Act, was passed 
205. Swire, supra note 183, at 1308.
206. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
207. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1823(a)(7)(B) (2006); see also Swire, 
supra note 183, at 1308.
208. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B).
209. See id. § 1861.
210. See Swire, supra note 183, at 1308.
211. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32186, USA PATRIOT
ACT SUNSET: PROVISIONS THAT EXPIRE ON DECEMBER 31, 2005, at 2 (2005), 
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL32186.pdf.
212. Permanent Provisions of the Patriot Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. 
on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 1-2 (2011) (statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Sec.).
213. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Senate Passes Legislation to Renew Patriot 
Act, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2006, at A14, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/03/politics/03patriot.html?_r=0.
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to further expand the FBI’s authority on matters of surveillance.214
And since 2009, despite the election of a President who pledged to 
correct the previous Administration’s abuse of executive power, 
expiring provisions of FISA have been reauthorized every year, amid 
significantly less fanfare than the first debate in 2005.215 The latest 
round of FISA extensions was quietly passed at the end of 2012, the 
day before the amendments were set to expire, under the din of the 
fiscal cliff debates.216
The amendments made to FISA since 9/11 reflect the public’s
growing acceptance of broader government encroachment on civil 
liberties through massive, unregulated surveillance. For example, in 
June 2013, immediately after The Guardian and The Washington 
Post exposed massive, dragnet NSA surveillance programs 
implicating significant amounts of domestic communication, a Pew 
Research Center poll indicated that Americans were less concerned 
about NSA spying than they were in 2006 in the wake of the Bush 
Administration’s warrantless wiretapping program.217 The poll found 
that 
[o]verall, 56 percent of Americans consider the NSA’s accessing of 
telephone call records of millions of Americans through secret court 
orders “acceptable,” while 41 percent call the practice “unacceptable.” In 
2006, when news broke of the NSA’s monitoring of telephone and e-mail 
214. See Eric Lichtblau, Deal Is Struck to Overhaul Wiretap Law, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 2008, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20/washington/20fisacnd.html (discussing the 
creation of Section 702 and other expansions of FISA authority).
215. EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42725, REAUTHORIZATION 
OF THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT 1 (2013), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R42725.pdf.
216. Id.; see also Bill Keller, Op-Ed., Invasion of the Data Snatchers, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2013, at A23, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/opinion/keller-invasion-of-the-data-
snatchers.html (“Likewise, while we were all distracted by the dance on the fiscal 
cliff, the 112th Congress in its final days whisked through a renewal of the law that 
governs eavesdropping by American intelligence agencies on Americans’ phone 
calls and e-mail traffic. A couple of senators made modest attempts to hold the 
eavesdroppers more accountable by, for example, disclosing the number of law-
abiding citizens whose communications have been intercepted. Their efforts were 
voted down.”).
217. Jon Cohen, Most Americans Back NSA Tracking Phone Records, 
Prioritize Probes over Privacy, WASH. POST (June 10, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/most-americans-support-nsa-tracking-
phone-records-prioritize-investigations-over-privacy/2013/06/10/51e721d6-d204-
11e2-9f1a-1a7cdee20287_story.html; see also Greenwald, MacAskill & Poitras, 
supra note 2.
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communications without court approval, there was a closer divide on the 
practice––51 percent to 47 percent.218
While there is a significant difference between the two 
scenarios—in 2006, the surveillance was conducted without any 
judicial oversight, whereas the more recent instance involves court 
orders of some variety (secret ones, from a secret court)—the poll 
speaks to a broader acceptance of surveillance as a practice. This 
acceptance is the product of and further encourages the seeming 
ubiquity of authorized surveillance. It is a virtuous or a vicious cycle, 
depending on your point of view. The continued existence of 
surveillance makes us more comfortable with it, and our increased 
comfort can be read as tacit acceptance of surveillance as a feature of 
daily life.
And the incursion into individual privacy only grows deeper 
every day. On July 9, 2012, The New York Times reported that 
“cellphone carriers reported that they responded to a startling 1.3 
million demands for subscriber information last year from law 
enforcement agencies seeking text messages, caller locations and 
other information in the course of investigations.”219 Furthermore, the 
number of government requests for consumer information from 
private companies are growing.220 The Times reported that law-
enforcement requests writ large have been growing “with annual 
increases of between 12 percent and 16 percent in the last five 
years.”221
In fact, the U.S. has become the global leader in these sorts of 
requests. Twitter released a report indicating that, between January 1
and June 30 of 2012, it received 849 government requests for user 
information globally, 679 of which came from the United States.222
In that same time period, the United States government also led the 
218. Cohen, supra note 217.
219. Eric Lichtblau, More Demands on Cell Carriers in Surveillance, N.Y.
TIMES, July 9, 2012, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/cell-carriers-see-uptick-in-requests-to-aid-
surveillance.html.
220. See id. at A9.
221. Id.
222. Information Requests: January 1–June 30, 2012, TWITTER,
https://transparency.twitter.com/information-requests/2012/jan-jun (last visited Mar.
14, 2014).
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world in individual requests for user data made to Google at 7,969,
requesting information on a total of 16,281 accounts.223
As one intelligence official stated, the theory under which four-
star general and former Director of the NSA, Keith Alexander,
traditionally operated was one that said, “‘Rather than look for a 
single needle in the haystack, . . . [l]et’s collect the whole 
haystack.’”224 By having the ability to “‘[c]ollect it all, tag it, store 
it,’” the NSA would be able to go sifting through the data dump 
whenever it needed to.225
Responding to current surveillance norms, the government is 
seeking to codify new mechanisms for intelligence gathering. In July
2012, the White House came out in support of the Lieberman-Collins 
Bill, a cybersecurity measure that would allow unprecedented 
amounts of information sharing between private companies, 
collecting terabits of data on consumers, and the government.226 The 
information sharing provisions of the Lieberman-Collins Bill allow 
for the unencumbered exchange of vaguely defined “cybersecurity 
threat indicators” between private entities and, furthermore, allow 
private entities designated as “cybersecurity exchanges” to disclose 
cybersecurity threat information to the government.227 To encourage 
participation in the data-sharing program, private entities are 
promised full immunity for any consumer lawsuits arising from their 
participation.228 While the Lieberman-Collins Bill failed to make it 
223. Transparency Report, GOOGLE,
http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/countries/?p=2012-06
(last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
224. Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, For NSA Chief, Terrorist Threat 





226. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
POLICY: S. 3414—CYBER SECURITY ACT OF 2012 (2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saps3414s_20
120726.pdf; Jennifer Granick, Revised Cybersecurity Act Needs Amendments for 
Privacy, Security, CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (July 20, 2012, 4:58 PM), 
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/07/revised-cybersecurity-act-needs-
amendments-privacy-security.
227. Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong. §§ 701-08 (2012) 
(authorizing “any private entity [to] disclose lawfully obtained cybersecurity threat 
indicators to any other private entity” and to federally operated “cybersecurity 
exchanges”).
228. See id. § 706(a)(2)(D).
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out of committee,229 similar language was passed by the House of 
Representatives in its Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act 
(CISPA) by a vote of 288 to 127.230 The introduction and passage of 
such bills in the House of Representatives emphasizes the new 
normal in surveillance culture: the government gathers the haystack 
without probable cause and searches for the needle—or at least 
something shiny. 
In today’s surveillance culture, laws and practices that 
authorize more and more government spying are permissible, if not 
expected. As a result, the acceptable boundaries of surveillance law 
have become so broad that, until recently, the New York Police 
Department was engaging in a targeted surveillance effort of Muslim 
student groups “at more than a dozen universities across the 
Northeast, framing the effort as one way to guard against the threat 
of terrorism.”231 Former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg 
said of the NYPD’s program, “‘That’s what you would expect them 
to do. That’s what you would want them to.’”232
There are some criticisms of this account of surveillance 
culture. At the highest level, there is the counterargument that our 
surveillance culture is something that we have willingly agreed to—
not something that has been foisted upon us, unwittingly.233 There are 
two forms of this counterargument. One argues that surveillance 
culture is something we understand and accept when we choose 
229. Jennifer Martinez & Ramsey Cox, Senate Votes Down Lieberman, 
Collins Cybersecurity Act a Second Time, HILL BLOG (Nov. 14, 2012, 11:12 PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/268053-senate-rejects-
cybersecurity-act-for-second-time.
230. 159 CONG. REC. H2130, H2144 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2013). CISPA 
authorizes the sharing of “cyber threat information . . . with the . . . Government”
and further allows the government to use that information for any number of 
purposes, including not only the prevention of cyber-terrorism, but also “the 
investigation and prosecution of cybersecurity crimes[,] . . . the investigation and 
prosecution of crimes involving . . . danger of death or serious bodily harm[,] . . 
.[and] the protection of minors from child pornography.” Cyber Intelligence Sharing 
and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 113th Cong. § 2(c)(1) (2013).
231. See Al Baker & Kate Taylor, Mayor Defends Monitoring of Muslim 
Students on Web, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2012, at A18. This program has recently 
been shut down. Matt Apuzzo & Joseph Goldstein, New York Drops Unit That Spied 
on Muslims, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/16/nyregion/police-unit-that-spied-on-muslims-is-
disbanded.html.
232. Id. (quoting New York City Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg).
233. I thank Professor Molly Land and Dru Brenner-Beck for each separately 
flagging this point for me.
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“free” communication, networking, and entertainment applications in 
exchange for our privacy. In a world where we agree to allow 
Google’s algorithms to read our emails so that they may direct 
relevant advertising our way, can we really say that it is the evolution 
of the Attorney General Guidelines that has made us numb to 
surveillance? The other form of the argument suggests that the 
national conversation that occurred after 9/11 affirmed the new 
national security norms. This was demonstrated by the 
overwhelming support for the PATRIOT Act both when it was first 
passed and when its provisions were set to expire.234
Both of these arguments are unsatisfying. Taking each in turn, 
there is no reason to think that because we agree to provide 
information to Google, we also agree to provide that same 
information to the government. There is undoubtedly some reduction 
in privacy that we have all come to accept in this highly data-driven 
existence we collectively lead, but a reduction in privacy vis-a-vis
the private companies with which we transact does not necessarily 
imply a reduced expectation of privacy with the government. This is 
for obvious reasons. I share information with Google because 
Google uses that information to show me advertisements I might find 
useful or make my search queries more personalized. However, 
sharing information with the government is a different proposition all 
together. While the government may use my information to more 
efficiently and effectively deliver services, it can also use my 
information in more insidious ways. After all, the government is the 
only institution that can legitimately use force against its citizens. It 
can preventatively institutionalize dangerous persons,235 and, perhaps 
more likely, it can wield the immense power of the administrative 
state against its citizens, inhibiting their ability to travel (no-fly lists)
and making it difficult to obtain social services and benefits.236 As 
234. Thanks to Professor Rob Knowles for this astute insight.
235. Carol S. Steiker, Foreword: The Limits of the Preventative State, 88 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 771, 774 (1998) (“But punishment is not the only, the 
most common, or the most effective means of crime prevention. The state can also 
attempt to identify and neutralize dangerous individuals before they commit crimes 
by restricting their liberty in a variety of ways. In pursuing this goal, the state often 
will expand the functions of the institutions primarily involved in the criminal 
justice system—namely, the police and the prison. But other analogous institutions, 
such [as] the juvenile justice system and the civil commitment process, are also 
sometimes tools of, to coin another phrase, the ‘preventive state.’” (footnote 
omitted)).
236. Joe Silver, After Seven Years, Exactly One Person Gets Off the Gov’t No-
Fly List, ARSTECHNICA (Mar. 27, 2014, 6:10 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
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Professor Jack Balkin has suggested, “Governments will use 
surveillance, data collection, and data mining technologies not only 
to keep Americans safe from terrorist attacks but also to prevent 
ordinary crime and deliver social services.”237
The alternate argument, that surveillance culture is something 
that the public has intentionally accepted after 9/11, is also 
unsatisfying. Consider the evolution of the public response to the 
2013 NSA surveillance scandal versus the 2006 NSA surveillance 
scandal.238 As I discussed earlier, the first polls that came out after 
the Snowden leaks indicated that the level of outrage against the 
2013 scandal was notably less than the outrage that followed the 
2006 scandal.239 However, importantly, as time went on and more 
information was released with regards to this latest scandal, the 
outrage has grown. A 2013 Quinnipiac University Polling 
Institute poll conducted one month after the Snowden leaks found 
that 45% of Americans said that government goes too far in 
restricting civil liberties as part of the war on terrorism, while only
40% said that government does not go far enough to adequately 
protect the country.240 The finding contrasted a poll taken in 2010 by 
Quinnipiac, which showed that only 25% of Americans said 
government goes too far in restricting civil liberties, while 63% said 
government does not go far enough.241
This poll, when understood in the context of the Pew polling 
data I discussed earlier, tells an interesting story: immediately after 
the Snowden leak, the public displayed more support for government 
surveillance practices than it did in the years more immediately 
following 9/11. However, after more information emerged on the 
scope of intelligence-gathering activities at issue, that support 
noticeably dwindled. It can hardly be the case that a culture that truly 
reflects national consensus shifts upon learning the details of the 
surveillance programs it supposedly supports. Rather, this polling 
policy/2014/03/after-seven-years-exactly-one-person-gets-off-the-govt-no-fly-list/ 
(discussing one woman’s “‘Kafkaesque’ legal battle over the government no-fly 
list”).
237. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008).
238. See supra text accompanying notes 217-18.
239. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
240. PETER BROWN, QUINNIPIAC UNIV. POLLING INST., U.S. VOTERS SAY 
SNOWDEN IS WHISTLE-BLOWER, NOT TRAITOR, QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY NATIONAL 
POLL FINDS; BIG SHIFT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES VS. COUNTER-TERRORISM (2013),
available at http://www.quinnipiac.edu/images/polling/us/us07102013.pdf.
241. Id.
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data calls into question whether the PATRIOT Act in fact reflected a
new national consensus on surveillance norms.
V. CONDITIONS THAT FACILITATE SHADOW ADMINISTRATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Having explored the motivations for norm entrepreneurship 
and norm entrenchment, this Part explores the conditions that 
facilitate shadow administrative constitutionalism in the national 
security arena.242 In particular, this Part suggests there are two 
features of national security policymaking that make it a breeding 
ground for shadow administrative constitutionalism: first, the “super-
deference” that applies to agency activity in this area, and second, 
the secrecy that necessarily accompanies national security 
policymaking.
A. “Super-Deference”
There is a strong culture of deference to agencies on issues of 
national security. This is the result of two different cultures of 
deference at play: the deference that applies to the executive 
branch’s central authority and responsibility to protect our national 
security, and the deference given to agency expertise as noted in 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.243 These distinct rationales 
create a compounding effect that results in what I call “super-
deference” to the executive branch on national security issues.244
242. Though this area is still under-theorized, there has been a flurry of post-
9/11 scholarship on the role of administrative agencies in the national security arena. 
See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law,
116 YALE L.J. 1170, 1173 (2007); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to 
War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2672 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Our Schmittian 
Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1101 (2009); John Yoo, 
Administration of War, 58 DUKE L.J. 2277, 2281 (2009).
243. 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010). 
244. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 242, at 2671 (“[T]he President [should] 
receive[] the kind of super-strong deference that derives from the combination of 
Chevron with what are plausibly taken to be his constitutional responsibilities.”). 
My theory of super-deference is different from Professor Sunstein’s “super-strong 
deference” largely because I am referring to deference to the agency, not the 
President. Chevron deference applies to agencies as understood under the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA). See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). The President 
does not fall within the purview of the APA, and therefore does not trigger Chevron
deference. Instead, the President receives deference in accordance with the 
Youngstown framework, which outside of times of emergency, provides for limited 
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Alexis de Tocqueville recognized early on in this country’s
history that “[i]t is chiefly in its foreign relations that the executive 
power of a nation finds occasion to exert its skill and . . . strength.”245
De Tocqueville presciently noted, “If the existence of the [American] 
Union were perpetually threatened, . . . the executive . . . would 
assume . . . increased importance.”246 For the early part of American 
history, threats to American existence were occasional and short-
lived, limiting the growth of executive power.247 However, the 
“chronic international crisis known as the Cold War,” as Arthur 
Schlesinger later found, “at last gave presidents the opportunity for 
sustained exercise of . . . almost royal prerogatives.”248 The executive 
possessing “almost royal prerogative[]”—what Schlesinger termed 
the “[i]mperial [p]residency”—reached its apex with President 
Nixon.249
To curb the excesses of executive power, Congress, 
contemporaneously with the issuance of the Attorney General 
Guidelines, passed the War Powers Resolution,250 the National 
Emergencies Act,251 the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act,252 and the Inspector General Act of 1978.253 However, as 
Professors Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule argue, these efforts, 
though well-meaning, were largely ineffective, and the regrowth of 
deference to the President. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel 
Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). The Youngstown
framework highlights a second order point, which is that agency action in the area of 
national security receives considerable deference as an ordinary matter, whereas 
presidential decision making in the area of national security receives heightened 
deference only during time of emergency. Id. By this account, administrative 
constitutionalism allows agencies to shift constitutional norms in a way the 
President would be unable to unless she was in the midst of a national emergency, 
where her powers would be at their apex. Id.
245. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 158 (Francis 
Bowen ed., Henry Reeve trans., 6th ed., Boston, John Allyn 1876).
246. Id.
247. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, at x (First 
Mariner Books 2004) (1973).
248. Id.
249. Id. at x, xvi.
250. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (2006)).
251. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) 
(codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
252. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 
Stat. 1625 (1977) (codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
253. Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101
(codified at 5 U.S.C. app. 3).
116 Michigan State Law Review 2014:59
executive power began soon after the dust settled from the tumult of 
the early 1970s.254 Key causes for the failed reform effort include a 
combination of judicial deference to the executive branch on political 
questions, national security, and foreign affairs efforts, and limited 
resources for both congressional oversight as well as internal 
executive branch checks and balances.255
Separately, this history reminds us that, unlike other areas in 
which the executive branch exercises authority, executive expertise 
on issues of war, peace, and the various states of security that exist in 
between is authoritative. Agencies acting pursuant to the national 
security mandate—including the DOJ, the FBI, the CIA, the 
Department of Defense (DOD), and the National Security Agency 
(NSA)—are granted deference in their decisions because they are 
understood to operate with a level of expertise that is unrivaled 
among the three branches of government. In Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, the Court emphasized the appropriateness of this sort of 
deference by reiterating a point it had previously made in 
Boumediene v. Bush that “‘neither the Members of this Court nor 
most federal judges begin the day with briefings that may describe 
new and serious threats to our Nation and its people.’”256
Consequently, the Court held that “when it comes to collecting 
evidence and drawing factual inferences” on national security issues, 
“‘the lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked,’ and 
respect for the Government’s conclusions is appropriate.”257 Thus, 
agency norm entrepreneurship on issues of national security will 
often receive a level of deference that undercuts the deliberative 
process required under administrative constitutionalism.258
Operating together, agency expertise and executive branch
authority on national security elicit a sort of super-deference that 
applies to agency norm entrepreneurship in the national security 
arena.
254. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND:
AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 86-87 (2010). 
255. See id.
256. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2727 (2010) 
(quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008)).
257. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65 
(1981)).
258. See also Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 26 
(2008) (deferring to the executive branch’s reasoning for according weight to 
national security claims).
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B. Secrecy 
The second reason national security policymaking lends itself 
to shadow administrative constitutionalism is secrecy. National 
security demands the government operate with some secrecy. 
Announcing our plan of attack or our weakest defenses threatens to 
sacrifice national security at the altar of transparency. As Former 
Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti noted in a law review article 
over thirty years ago:
Even if we are able to gain information concerning a hostile foreign 
nation, our success will be shortlived [sic] if we disclose the facts of our 
success. Further, if we reveal the information obtained, we will not only 
lose our advantage and risk changes in the acquired plans, but we will also 
jeopardize or perhaps destroy our sources and methods of gathering 
information.259
With transparency in the national security context at times 
fundamentally at odds with the mission, the deliberation that is 
facilitated through open dialogue is significantly hampered. 
Comparatively, agencies outside the national security arena are 
required to be transparent with their findings, their sources of 
information, and, most of all, their successes and failures. This 
transparency is built into the notice-and-comment requirements of 
the Administrative Procedures Act and mandated more generally by 
the Freedom of Information Act, both of which bind most 
agencies.260 However, both statutes provide explicit exemptions for 
national security purposes.261 As a consequence, national security 
policymaking often occurs in secret, avoiding the public deliberation 
that occurs with more transparent institutions.
259. Benjamin R. Civiletti, Intelligence Gathering and the Law: Conflict or 
Compatibility?, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 883, 888 (1980).
260. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2012); Administrative 
Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
261. The FOIA exemption for national security is codified at 5 U.S.C. § 
552(b)(7). Under the APA, agencies can seek a “good cause” exception to the 
notice-and-comment provisions. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B). As some have mentioned, 
“[T]he mere mention of national security tends to suggest good cause for immediate 
government action, even when the government is actually loosening previously 
established regulations.” William S. Jordan, III, Rulemaking, in DEVELOPMENTS IN 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE 2011, at 12 (Jeffrey S. Lubbers 
ed., 2012), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/administrative_law/2011/11/20
11_fall_administrativelawconference/rulemaking_chapter_2011.authcheckdam.pdf.
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VI. FORCING ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM OUT OF THE 
SHADOWS
Administrative constitutionalism can morph into shadow 
administrative constitutionalism when agency norms are allowed to 
develop in the shadows and become entrenched without deliberation. 
To force administrative constitutionalism from the shadows, 
deliberation-forcing mechanisms must be created and reinforced. 
Such mechanisms must ensure three types of deliberation: 
intrabranch, interbranch, and public. This final Part proceeds by first 
exploring the failure of existing mechanisms of deliberation in the 
context of the Attorney General Guidelines and then suggesting ways 
in which to modify or reinforce these mechanisms. Importantly, 
some suggestions are more viable than others, and I will offer an 
initial, rough assessment of the viability of each suggestion.
A. Checks and Balances Within the Executive Branch
The growth of executive power and the administrative state has 
been a fascinating area of scholarship for the last twenty years, with 
each President providing more intellectual fodder than his 
predecessor.262 As one scholar has noted, “While it was relatively 
rare, and for the most part inconsequential, during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, unilateral policy making has become an integral 
feature of the modern presidency.”263
262. To be fair, the growth of executive power was discussed and 
documented long before the Clinton Administration. Arthur Schlesinger’s book, The 
Imperial Presidency, marks the beginning of the academic focus on executive 
power. SCHLESINGER, supra note 247; see also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE 
NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA 
AFFAIR (1990); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s 
Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 (1994); Elena Kagan, Presidential 
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001); M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond 
Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 (2001); 
Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive 
Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676 (2005); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of 
Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J.
2314 (2006); BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN 
REPUBLIC (2010); Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1688 (2011) (reviewing ACKERMAN, supra).
263. WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF 
DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 179 (2003). For the Clinton Administration, this point 
is chronicled in Justice Elena Kagan’s early piece, Presidential Administration. See 
Kagan, supra note 262.
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To rein in an increasingly powerful executive, some scholars 
have suggested that the executive branch bureaucracy, comprised of 
it its many agencies and offices, can provide its own checks and 
balances.264 These checks and balances might include some 
combination of interagency review of national security policies and 
procedures,265 direct oversight of national security activities by high-
ranking members of the executive branch,266 and encouragement of
dissent and whistleblowing.267
1. Interagency Review
Interagency review of executive branch action ensures that the 
often disparately motivated and sometimes diametrically opposed 
agencies and offices within the executive branch temper the 
bureaucratic instincts of any one agency or office. 
The recent politics around drone warfare provide an illustrative 
example. Drone strikes, the unmanned aerial attacks that have gained 
popularity both for their ability to keep U.S. personnel outside of 
harm’s way and for their ability to target suspects with a 
comparatively high degree of accuracy,268 have been used by the U.S. 
government only after the 9/11 attacks and have increased in
frequency under the Obama Administration.269 However, despite 
264. Katyal, supra note 262.
265. Professor Harold Koh suggested interagency review as a useful check 
on executive power nearly twenty-five years ago in his book, The National Security 
Constitution: Sharing Power After the Iran-Contra Affair. See KOH, supra note 262,
at 161-62.
266. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 262, at 2324-27; see also Kenneth A. 
Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking in Administrative 
Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 96 (2008) (noting the importance of independent 
“embedded privacy experts” in the Department of Homeland Security “specifically 
charged with advancing privacy among competing agency interests, located in a 
central position within the agency decisionmaking structure, drawing on internal 
relationships and external sources of power, and able to operate with relative 
independence”).
267. Katyal, supra note 262, at 2328-30.
268. See President Barack Obama, Remarks at the National Defense 
University (May 23, 2013), available at
http://www.npr.org/2013/05/23/186305171/transcript-obama-addresses-
counterterrorism-drones.
269. Greg Miller, Ellen Nakashima & Karen DeYoung, CIA Drone Strikes 
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their prevalence, the authority and parameters of their use has 
remained murky.270
After receiving considerable public pushback on the legality of 
the Administration’s drone program, the White House began crafting 
a counterterrorism “playbook” that “establish[ed] clear rules for 
targeted-killing operations.”271 While the primary goal of the 
playbook was to transfer drone operations from the opacity of the 
CIA to the relative transparency of the Defense Department, the 
playbook also tightened standards by requiring “White House 
approval of drone strikes and the involvement of multiple agencies––
including the State Department––in nominating new names for kill 
lists.”272 The hope of this latter requirement is that the diplomatic 
expertise of the State Department and the legal expertise of the DOJ
will act as counterweights to the DOD’s hawkish instincts, 
exemplifying how internal checks and balances successfully might 
rein in executive power.273
Comparatively, the Attorney General Guidelines have been 
issued by the DOJ without any formal interagency review. The 
Guidelines are not mandatorily shared with any other department or 
office that might provide a counterweight to the DOJ.274 However, 
demanding interagency review begs the question: which agencies 
would be appropriate reviewers? Which agencies could represent the 
civil liberties side of the national security debate? There are no 
obvious candidates.
270. This “murkiness” was on full display in the aftermath of the drone strike 
that killed American citizen and Muslim cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki. Mark Mazzetti, 
Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.-Born Militant in a Car in 
Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1. Furthermore, despite recent Obama 
Administration speeches and leaks intended to clarify the U.S. position on drone 
strikes, there are still more questions than answers. See Obama, supra note 268.
271. Miller, Nakashima & DeYoung, supra note 269.
272. Id.
273. Id. Interestingly, the playbook makes one large exception: the CIA’s
drone campaign in Pakistan. Id. None of the rules—the transparency, the internal 
checks and balances—apply to Pakistan. Id. This is because senior administration 
officials “have been reluctant to alter the rules because of the drone campaign’s
results.” Id. This further corroborates the view that the strength of the national 
security mandate makes comprehensive oversight over national security programs 
and initiatives very difficult. See id.
274. The Attorney General obtains authority to issue governing guidelines 
for the FBI from Executive Order 12,333, which states that the FBI is subject to “the 
supervision of the Attorney General and [must act] pursuant to such regulations as 
the Attorney General may establish.” See 3 C.F.R. § 1.14 (1982).
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That is not to say that there have not been efforts to create an 
agency dedicated to representing civil liberties concerns within the 
executive branch. The Final Report of the National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (9/11 Commission) 
recommended, “[T]here should be a board within the executive 
branch to oversee adherence to the guidelines we recommend and the 
commitment the government makes to defend our civil liberties.”275
As a result, the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board
(PCLOB) was authorized in 2004.276 However, the path from 
authorization to operationalization was a long one. Thanks in part to 
pressure from a bipartisan group of Senators, the Bush White House 
finally instituted the Board, and, on March 14, 2006, the PCLOB was 
finally up and running.277 By June 2007, the PCLOB had fallen apart 
with one member resigning because he felt that the organization was 
not sufficiently independent to effectively do its job.278 The PCLOB 
was indeed far from independent. As one report indicates:
[The PCLOB] was located in the EOP [Executive Office of the President], 
an enclave of agencies immediately serving the President. Only two of its 
five members were subject to Senate approval, and all five served at the 
pleasure of the President. Its advice was to be “to the President or to the 
head of any department or agency of the executive branch.” Although it 
was to report to Congress at least annually, it was not clear if its members 
or chair would testify before congressional committees or if the board 
could otherwise assist Congress. The board’s budget was presented as an 
account within the funding request for the White House Office (WHO), 
suggesting that it was a subunit of the WHO (although the board’s
chartering legislation placed it in the EOP, making it a coequal agency to 
the WHO).279
275. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 395 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
276. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-458, §§ 1061-62, 118 Stat. 3638, 3684-88 (2004) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 601 
note (2006)).
277. GARRETT HATCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34385, PRIVACY AND 
CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD: NEW INDEPENDENT AGENCY STATUS 4 (2012),
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34385.pdf.
278. Id. at 4-5. Lanny Davis resigned on May 14, 2007 because “he felt the 
board members had interpreted their oversight responsibilities too narrowly and that 
they had not exercised adequate independence when they accepted extensive 
redlining by Administration officials of the board’s first report to Congress.” Id. at 
4; see also John Solomon & Ellen Nakashima, White House Edits to Privacy 
Board’s Report Spur Resignation, WASH. POST, May 15, 2007, at A5.
279. HATCH, supra note 277, at 5 (footnote omitted) (quoting § 1061, 118 
Stat. at 3684).
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Congress responded quickly by passing legislation in August 
2007 to significantly restructure the PCLOB.280 Under the new 
statute, the PCLOB is an independent agency to be composed of five
members, four of whom are part time from outside the government 
and the fifth, the chairperson, is the full time member.281 All five 
members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate 
for a term of six years to prevent wholesale capture by a given 
Administration.282 Its authorizing statute mandates that no more than 
three members can be from one political party with the other two 
chosen by the White House under consultation with Senate and 
House minority leadership.283
Despite these congressional efforts to force internal interagency 
oversight on intelligence issues, from 2007 until 2012, no members 
were ever appointed to the PCLOB.284 In mid-2013, after significant 
pressure from both within and outside the Administration, the full 
board was nominated and confirmed.285 Time will ultimately tell how 
effective the PCLOB will be as a source of productive tension within 
the national security arena. Working against it is the fact that “[f]our 
of the board members technically must be part time under the law; 
only [David] Medine, the fifth, can work on a full-time basis as 
chairman. The oversight body also lacks much of a workforce: At the 
moment it’s mostly staff members on loan from other agencies.”286
Assuming PCLOB is capable of taking on such a huge responsibility, 
280. See Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 801, 121 Stat. 266, 352 (2007) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. § 2000ee (Supp. I 2009)).
281. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ee(h)(1).
282. Id. § 2000ee(h)(2).
283. Id.
284. See Scott Shane, The Troubled Life of the Privacy and Civil Liberties 
Oversight Board, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Aug. 9, 2012, 9:49 AM),
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/09/the-troubled-life-of-the-privacy-and-
civil-liberties-oversight-board; see also Michael Daniel, Danny Weitzner & Quentin 
Palfrey, Senate Confirms Four Nominees to Privacy & Civil Liberties Board,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV BLOG (Aug. 3, 2012, 4:55 PM), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov//blog/2012/08/03/senate-confirms-four-nominees-
privacy-civil-liberties-board.
285. See Jedidiah Bracy, Medine’s Confirmation Moves PCLOB Forward; 




286. Tony Romm, Growing Pains for Privacy Watchdog PCLOB, POLITICO
(July 17, 2013, 11:58 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/growing-pains-
privacy-pclob-94388.html. 
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its success will be contingent on its members being included in 
national security related decision making and its ability to effectively 
wield power and influence on these issues. 
2. Oversight by High-Ranking Officials
A second mechanism by which to construct checks and 
balances on the FBI is to have direct oversight over the Attorney 
General Guidelines by high-ranking members within the executive
branch in order to create a separate source of responsibility and 
accountability for overreach. One such oversight effort has been the 
creation of an Office of the Inspector General (OIG) within agencies, 
including the DOJ.287 Though the OIG has been a valuable check on 
agency activity, it is, as it currently stands, ill-equipped to be an 
effective check on the Attorney General Guidelines. 
The OIG within the DOJ is a statutorily created position.288 The 
Inspector General is appointed by the President, subject to Senate 
confirmation, and reports both to the Attorney General and 
Congress.289 This structure was created in order to ensure maximum 
independence of the OIG within the agency. The mission of the 
Justice Department’s OIG “is to detect and deter waste, fraud, abuse, 
and misconduct in DOJ programs and personnel.”290 Under this 
language, investigating potentially illegal activities conducted 
pursuant to the Attorney General’s Guidelines fits squarely within 
the OIG’s mandate.
Despite the broad language, Dan Meyer, former Director for 
Whistleblowing and Transparency at the DOD, described the 
mandate as being much narrower in practice.291 Meyer explained 
that, due to the resource constraints facing most OIGs, there is a 
limited amount of oversight that the office can provide.292 Thus, 
OIGs often focus on activities that are both clearly illegal and easy to 
fix. For example, within the DOD, the OIG directs a substantial 
amount of its effort toward investigating corrupt defense contractors 
287. Thanks to Dru Brenner-Beck for this insight and for countless others. 
288. About the Office, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/oig/about/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Telephone Interview with Dan Meyer, former Dir., Whistleblowing & 
Transparency, U.S. Dep’t of Def. (May 24, 2013).
292. Id.
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and other traditional forms of waste, fraud, and abuse.293 Meyer 
described the OIG’s authority as covering a sphere of activity, the 
center of which is comprised of clear-cut and easily identifiable 
instances of waste, fraud, and abuse, and the outer edges of which 
contain those questionably legal activities that require significant 
resources to investigate fully.294 Because of the resource constraints 
that the OIG invariably faces, the office is motivated to focus on the 
center of the sphere instead of the outer edges.
If Meyer’s theory is correct, broad shifts in mission and process 
that raise difficult questions regarding the scope of legally authorized 
behavior often evade Inspector General review. This view is 
supported by Professors Posner and Vermeule, who note that
“the Inspectors General have been more or less effective at what they do, 
but what they do has not been effective. That is, they do a relatively good 
job of compliance monitoring, but compliance monitoring alone has not 
been that effective at increasing governmental accountability. Audits and 
investigations focus too much on small problems at the expense of larger 
systemic issues.”295
Fixing the oversight problem is eminently possible. Currently, 
Inspector General’s offices are understaffed and operate with an 
extremely broad mission that includes going after people who are 
cheating the United States Government and also going after the 
United States Government for potentially cheating Americans of 
their civil liberties. These are jobs that are fundamentally different in 
both the scope and the resources needed.
Creating an OIG for internal affairs and an OIG for external 
affairs is one solution to this problem. An OIG for internal affairs 
ensures that the contractors and the employees are clean and that 
there is no waste, fraud, and abuse among programs and employees. 
An OIG for external affairs would be specifically responsible for 
monitoring programs that encroach on the rights of the public. An 
OIG for external affairs within the Justice Department would be 
responsible for monitoring the evolution and implementation of the 
Attorney General Guidelines and other such national security efforts.
In this function, the OIG for external affairs becomes the designated 
293. About Us, OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
http://www.dodig.mil/About_Us/index.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2014).
294. Telephone Interview with Dan Meyer, supra note 291.
295. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 254, at 87 (quoting William S. Fields, 
The Enigma of Bureaucratic Accountability, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 505, 516-17
(1994) (reviewing PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS 
GENERAL AND THE SEARCH FOR ACCOUNTABILITY (1993))). 
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public advocate within an agency. Importantly, in this role, the OIG
for external affairs functions very similarly to the PCLOB. However, 
redundancy, especially when it comes to protecting civil liberties, 
can be virtue. 
3. Dissent Channel: Whistleblowing
A third mechanism by which to create internal checks and 
balances is, as Professor Neal Katyal calls them, “dissent 
channel[s].”296 Katyal illustrates the value of dissent in practice 
through the example of the State Department’s “Dissent Channel,”
which offers “any officer in any embassy the ability and power to 
disagree with the position taken by the ambassador or high-ranking 
officials.”297 Unlike the State Department, the DOJ does not have an 
established dissent channel, and the addition of one could prove 
useful.
The State Department’s Dissent Channel allows individuals 
within the agency to share their dissenting views anonymously with 
the agency’s well-regarded Policy Planning Staff.298 The Policy 
Planning Staff is then responsible for funneling the most important 
concerns to higher-level people within the agency, including the 
Secretary of State.299 This Dissent Channel is, by Katyal’s account, a
successful method of ensuring the agency operates interactively 
instead of entirely through command-and-control leadership. 
Moreover, it creates an opportunity for private dissent in an 
environment where, because of the confidentiality that attaches to 
official business, public dissent is not possible.
The DOJ does not have an established dissent channel and, as 
one government official explained off the record, dissent is not
encouraged within the FBI.300 This is because, like the State 
Department, the institutional mandate does not support it, requiring 
instead strict command-and-control leadership. Also like the State 
Department, the secrecy that the FBI sometimes needs to operate 
under prohibits more public forms of dissent. These similarities 
make a State Department-styled Dissent Channel within the Justice 
Department a potentially valuable intra-agency check and balance. 
296. Katyal, supra note 262, at 2339.
297. Id. at 2328.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 2328-29.
300. Telephone Interview with anonymous source (May 28, 2013).
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Another mechanism to support internal dissent is to promote 
whistleblower protections. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 
(CSRA) first established statutory whistleblower protections for 
federal employees to encourage disclosure of government illegality, 
waste, fraud, and abuse.301 Soon after, the reforms were narrowed 
through a sequence of court decisions. This prompted congressional 
revisions of the law in 1989, 1994, and, most recently, in 2012 with 
the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act (WPEA).302
Despite this set of reforms, whistleblower protections for the 
intelligence community remain weak. Section 105 of the WPEA 
exempts “the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the 
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National 
Reconnaissance Office,” and any other agency “as determined by the 
President, any Executive agency or unit thereof the principal 
function of which is the conduct of foreign intelligence or 
counterintelligence activities, provided that the determination be 
made prior to a personnel action.”303 After the Snowden leaks 
became public, some members of the press and public-interest 
organizations pointed to this weakness as one reason for the public 
nature of the leak.304
Furthermore, even national security whistleblowers who do not 
fear reprisal by their employers are unable to alert the public to 
potentially illegal activities because such activities are oftentimes 
classified and cannot be disclosed without violating federal law.305
And though a whistleblower cannot legally be punished for 
301. See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 101(a), 92 
Stat. 1111, 1116 (1978) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2006)). 
302. See Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-199, 126 Stat. 1465 (2012) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 2302 (2012)).
303. Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act § 105. 
304. See, e.g., Pema Levy, Loopholes Exclude Intelligence Contractors like 
Snowden from Whistleblower Protections, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 11, 2013),
http://www.ibtimes.com/loopholes-exclude-intelligence-contractors-snowden-
whistleblower-protections-1301913; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH STATEMENT ON U.S. PROTECTION OF WHISTLEBLOWERS IN THE SECURITY 
SECTOR 2, 10 (2013), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/HRW_Statement_on_US_Pr
otection_of_Whistleblowers_in_the_Security_Sector_6-18-13_0.pdf. 
305. See Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. §§ 793-99 (2000); see also Jamie 
Sasser, Comment, Silenced Citizens: The Post-Garcetti Landscape for Public Sector 
Employees Working in National Security, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 759, 760-61 (2007).
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disclosing clearly illegal practices that are otherwise classified,306 this 
loophole requires a whistleblower to conduct the impossible task of 
determining that a given activity is clearly illegal without being able 
to take the issue to court for such a determination. A whistleblower 
that discloses the existence of classified information documenting 
practices or activities that are most likely illegal is faced with 
potential criminal repercussions unless she discloses such 
information to a clearance-holding member of the United States 
Government. 
The difficulty posed by classified information and the fear of 
reprisal makes dissent in the national security arena a complex and 
dangerous affair and, therefore, an unlikely occurrence. Failure to 
facilitate dissent within the FBI represents a failed opportunity for 
forcing intra-agency deliberation and allows for unchecked agency 
norm entrepreneurship.
Intra-agency checks and balances, such as the creation of 
dissent channels within the FBI and statutory amendments to the 
WPEA to extend whistleblower protections to the intelligence 
community, are, given the political climate in the wake of the 
Snowden NSA scandal, increasingly possible.307 There is significant 
attention directed to the Administration’s treatment of 
whistleblowers and growing recognition of the need for 
whistleblowers within the national security arena. This attention may 
create enough momentum to force Congress to revisit the WPEA and 
motivate an agency overhaul to promote both transparency and 
dissent within the FBI and the DOJ more broadly. 
Of course, shadow administrative constitutionalism is hardly 
the result of failures within the executive branch alone. Next, I 
explore the judicial failures that led to shadow administrative 
constitutionalism. 
306. See 3 C.F.R. § 1.7 (2004), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 (2006)
(establishing that clearly illegal activity cannot be properly classified in the first 
instance).
307. This references both the NSA PRISM scandal and the NSA link to the 
blanket Verizon FISC order. See Amy Davidson, America Through the N.S.A.’s 
Prism, NEW YORKER BLOG (June 7, 2013, 2:00 AM),
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2013/06/america-through-the-
nsas-prism.html.
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B. Interbranch Deliberation
1. Judicial Intervention
The Church Committee, reflecting on the Keith decision, 
emphasized the importance of judicial intervention in the national 
security arena when it reminded the public that warrantless 
wiretapping “had been permitted by successive presidents for more 
than a quarter of a century without ‘guidance from the Congress or a 
definitive decision of the Courts.’”308 Unfortunately, there are three 
barriers to judicial intervention that facilitate shadow administrative 
constitutionalism in the national security arena: the lack of judicially 
enforceable rights, the standing hurdle, and the growth of executive 
privilege.
a. Judicially Enforceable Rights
By the time the Civiletti Guidelines were issued in 1980, the 
DOJ made eminently clear that the Attorney General Guidelines
were “solely for the purpose of internal Department of Justice 
guidance”309 and would otherwise be legally binding. Specifically, 
the Guidelines made clear that “[t]hey are not intended to, do not, 
and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or 
procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any manner, civil or 
criminal.”310 Such rights-limiting language prevents any injured party 
from using the governing document of the FBI to enforce the self-
imposed limitations on the Bureau’s power.
308. S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. I, at 11 (1976) (quoting United States v. U.S. 
District Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 299 (1972)).
309. S. REP. NO. 97-682 app. D at 516 (1983); see also supra note 105, at 
787.
310. S. REP. NO. 97-682 app. D at 516. As Elliff describes:
Although the Levi guidelines contained no such language, the 1979 FBI 
charter bill expressly barred judicial enforcement of either the proposed 
statutory standards or the Attorney General’s guidelines that the bill 
required for FBI investigations. These provisions in the guidelines and the 
charter bill parallel the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Caceres, where the Court held that technical violations of Internal 
Revenue Service guidelines for undercover investigations should not lead 
to reversal of a conviction on either due process or statutory grounds.
Elliff, supra note 105, at 787 (footnotes omitted).
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b. The Standing Hurdle
The lack of judicially enforceable rights is not, however, the 
only problem. Those who might bring a First Amendment claim 
based on the surveillance authorized by the Attorney General 
Guidelines face immense difficulty simply getting into court.311 One 
of the primary problems with surveillance is that it has the power to 
coerce people into self-censorship—or chilled speech. This makes 
surveillance, fundamentally, a First Amendment issue and a prime 
subject for constitutional litigation. As our communications are 
increasingly subject to the prying eyes of the government, our ability 
to speak freely is directly curtailed. However, after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Laird v. Tatum, litigants suing under the First 
Amendment theory of chilled speech are subject to a high standing 
bar that, more often than not, prevents them from having their case 
heard at all.
The first mention of the term “chill” in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence occurred in 1952 in Wieman v. Updegraff, a case 
overturning an Oklahoma law that required all state employees to 
take a loyalty oath denying all affiliation, direct and indirect, with 
“any foreign political agency, party, organization or Government, or 
with any agency, party, organization, association, or group whatever 
which has been officially determined by the United States Attorney 
General or other authorized agency of the United States to be a 
communist front or subversive organization.”312 In an important 
concurrence, Justice Frankfurter argued that the loyalty oath had “an 
unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all 
teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice.”313 From that time 
to when the term “chilling effect” was first used in Dombrowski v. 
Pfister314 thirteen years later, Professor Frederick Schauer argues that 
311. And those who are able to get into court find themselves faced with 
judges who “frequently engage in a second-order inquiry about how a policy came 
to be instead of asking the first-order question how a policy works on the ground.”
Huq, supra note 202, at 889. Huq argues, “The extent of judicial reliance upon a 
logic of Separation of Powers as a crutch for the adjudication of counterterrorism 
cases is unparalleled.” Id. This faith in the separation of powers, when combined 
with Eskridge and Ferejohn’s urging of judicial deference in matters of 
administrative constitutionalism, creates layers of walls within the judicial branch, 
preventing litigation of the substantive issues at the heart of national security 
litigation.
312. 344 U.S. 183, 186 (1952).
313. Id. at 195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
314. 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
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the term evolved from an “emotive argument into a major 
substantive component of first amendment [sic] adjudication.”315
However, after Laird v. Tatum, litigating on the basis of 
chilling effects has become difficult. Tatum requires litigants to first 
prove that the surveillance in question led to a cognizable harm 
before they will be granted standing and further held that “the mere 
existence . . . of a governmental investigative and data-gathering 
activity that is alleged to be broader in scope than is reasonably 
necessary for the accomplishment of a valid governmental purpose”
was simply not a cognizable harm.316
As a result of Tatum, before an individual can bring a First 
Amendment claim against FBI based on the authorizations of the 
Attorney General Guidelines, she must first prove that she has been 
harmed by the often-secret surveillance.317 Because of the difficulty 
of first affirmatively identifying that one is the subject of 
government surveillance in order to allege a cognizable harm under 
the law, such litigation has been made increasingly unlikely under 
Tatum.
For example, in 2005, The New York Times exposed the 
President’s Surveillance Program (PSP), a program developed after 
9/11 that secretly authorized the NSA to intercept “the international 
telephone calls and international e-mail messages of hundreds, 
perhaps thousands, of people inside the United States without 
warrants over the past three years in an effort to track possible ‘dirty 
numbers’ linked to Al Qaeda.”318 “Additionally, the NSA told 
Congress that privileged communications, such as those between an 
attorney and her client, would not be ‘categorically excluded’ from 
interception.”319
This discovery led prominent civil rights organizations,
including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), to file 
315. Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the 
“Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 685 (1978) (footnote omitted); see also
Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1971); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 
U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of the U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 307
(1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
316. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 10 (1972).
317. Id. at 14.
318. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program.html. 
319. Kali Borkoski, Suing over Surveillance Secrets, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 
29, 2012, 9:33 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/suing-over-surveillance-
secrets/.
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lawsuits against the government arguing that their speech was chilled 
because their communications were likely targets of the surveillance 
program.320 The ACLU filed on behalf of itself and a group of 
journalists, scholars, and other organizations that regularly 
communicate with likely targets of the PSP.321 Importantly, none of 
the plaintiffs had evidence that they were in fact the subject of NSA 
surveillance.322 This was a fact that only the government knew and 
would not disclose. The Supreme Court held that, without this 
information, the plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their case.323
The standing barrier created by Tatum is especially problematic 
given the nature of surveillance today. Surveillance today no longer 
presents viable Fourth Amendment claims because so much of our 
most personal information is mediated through third parties, and the 
third-party doctrine limits the extent of Fourth Amendment 
protections.324 While Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in United 
States v. Jones provides some indication that this doctrine may be up 
320. See Complaint at 13, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-cv-
313 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2006), available at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_NSA_Complaint_01_06.pdf.
321. ACLU v. NSA: The Challenge to Illegal Spying, ACLU,
http://www.aclu.org/national-security/aclu-v-nsa-challenge-illegal-spying (last 
visited Mar. 14, 2014).
322. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013).
323. Id. at 1152. In a recent development, the government has, for the first 
time, notified a criminal defendant, Jamshid Muhtorov, that evidence obtained from 
a warrantless wiretap is expected to be used against him. Charlie Savage, Federal 
Prosecutors, in a Policy Shift, Cite Warrantless Wiretaps as Evidence, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/27/us/federal-prosecutors-in-a-
policy-shift-cite-warrantless-wiretaps-as-evidence.html?_r=0. The disclosure is 
expected to “set up a Supreme Court test of whether such eavesdropping is 
constitutional.” Id.
324. The third-party doctrine was articulated by the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Miller, where it held: 
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information 
revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, 
even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used 
only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will 
not be betrayed.
425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The third-party doctrine has suffered quite an assault at 
the hands of the legal academy. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PRIVACY AT 
RISK: THE NEW GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 151-64
(2007); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 3; Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: 
Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP.
L. REV. 975, 976 (2007). But see Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party 
Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 561, 561 (2009). 
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for reconsideration by the Supreme Court,325 until that time, the 
Fourth Amendment no longer provides a powerful source of legal 
recourse against the growth of surveillance authority. As a result, 
now, more than ever, the chilling effects doctrine must be revived in 
order to provide a First Amendment backstop to the growing 
problem of government surveillance. 
c. Executive Privilege
As Professor Heidi Kitrosser describes, “A claim of executive 
privilege is generally a claim by the President of a constitutional 
right to withhold information.”326 It is a claim whose authority lies 
not in the text of the Constitution or of any specific law, but rather in 
the “notion that some information requests effectively infringe on the 
President’s Article II powers, threatening his ability to receive 
candid advice or to protect national security.”327
Executive privilege as a means of obfuscation facilitates 
shadow administrative constitutionalism by preventing judicial 
oversight. Professor Jack Balkin first made this claim nearly ten 
years ago when he argued that, increasingly
we exclude more and more executive action from judicial review on the 
twin grounds of secrecy and efficiency. . . . [A]n independent judiciary 
plays an important role in making sure that zealous officials do not 
overreach. If the executive seeks greater efficiency, this requires a 
corresponding duty of greater disclosure before the fact and reporting after 
the fact to determine whether its surveillance programs are targeting the 
right people or are being abused.328
The courts have not taken heed to his warning.
In the wake of the disclosure of the PSP, there was one case 
that survived the extremely high standing bar set in Tatum. In Al-
Haramain Islamic Foundation v. Bush, an Islamic charity based in 
Oregon discovered that the government inadvertently sent them 
classified documents demonstrating that their communications were 
325. 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“I would ask 
whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and
aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at 
will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”).
326. Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege 
Revisited, 92 IOWA L. REV. 489, 491-92 (2007).
327. Id. at 492.
328. Balkin, supra note 237, at 23.
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subject to warrantless surveillance.329 With proof that they were in 
fact subject to surveillance, Al-Haramain proceeded to court. 
However, the government argued that the state-secrets privilege 
prevented the introduction of the classified documents and permitted 
the government to avoid acknowledging the existence of the 
surveillance program.330 Despite the fact that the classified 
information had already been disclosed (and in seemingly direct 
conflict with the government’s otherwise settled third-party 
doctrine), the Ninth Circuit agreed with the government’s position.331
The doctrinal barriers that prevent judicial intervention are 
significantly harder to overcome than the failures that stymie 
intrabranch checks and balances. This is in no small part due to the 
doctrine of stare decisis and the value of having binding precedent.
Even judges who recognize the problems with the current system and 
wish to reassert their role in determining both small-“c” and 
ultimately large-“C” constitutional meaning cannot. Judge Colleen 
McMahon expressed her frustration with the state-secrets privilege in 
a court opinion, saying, “I can find no way around the thicket of laws 
and precedents that effectively allow the Executive Branch of our 
Government to proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that seem 
on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws, while 
keeping the reasons for its conclusion a secret.”332 As a result, 
without a major shift in the doctrine, the judiciary will be limited in 
its ability to provide useful oversight.
2. Congressional Oversight
Congress is also capable of providing a powerful check on 
agency norm entrepreneurship. As the Church Committee reminded 
us, “[T]he Constitution provides for a system of checks and balances 
and interdependent power as between the Congress and the executive 
329. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (9th 
Cir. 2007).
330. Id. at 1197.
331. Id. at 1203. The court agreed to allow the case to proceed if plaintiffs 
were able to prove standing without the introduction of the classified document that 
indicated Al-Haramain was subject to government surveillance. Id. at 1205. 
Plaintiffs were able to introduce non-classified evidence supporting their 
surveillance claims; however, the case was ultimately still thrown out in the Ninth 
Circuit because the government argued and the court conceded that the government 
had not waived sovereign immunity. Id. at 1202-03.
332. N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 915 F. Supp. 2d 508, 515-16
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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branch.”333 The Committee warned that a Congress that doesn’t act, 
creating a “lack of clear legislation defining the authority for 
permissible intelligence activities,” violates the Constitution because, 
“[a]bsent clear legal boundaries for intelligence activities, the 
Constitution has been violated in secret and the power of the 
executive branch has gone unchecked, unbalanced.”334
Despite this warning, Congress failed to develop a legislative 
solution to FBI governance. Instead, it has left the Guidelines in 
place as “a signature pronouncement of the nation’s top legal 
officer” representing “what the Attorney General thinks is the 
appropriate balance between the government’s duty to prevent crime 
and to deter threats to the national security and the protection of the 
rights of Americans under the Constitution and the rule of law.”335
By deferring to the Attorney General to develop legal guidelines for 
its own investigative unit, Congress has abdicated a critical 
responsibility and facilitated the unregulated norm entrepreneurship
embodied in the evolution of the Attorney General Guidelines.
Congressional abdication of its responsibility did not end there. 
Congress also failed to exercise its oversight authority. For example, 
the Judiciary Committees of both the House and the Senate have 
oversight authority of the FBI. Through regular and rigorous 
oversight hearings on the Attorney General Guidelines, Congress 
could have forced a dialogue about the norms embedded in and 
introduced through the Guidelines. Instead, there has been no 
mandatory or systematic oversight carried out with respect to the 
Attorney General Guidelines. Emblematic of the problem, in 2008, at 
a Senate hearing, Senator Bond, Vice Chairman of the Judiciary 
Committee, thanked the FBI for sharing an advance copy of the
Guidelines, saying, “I’m pleased the Department of Justice and the 
FBI have taken the unprecedented step of consulting with Congress 
prior to the adoption of the guidelines.”336 That such communication 
333. S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. I, at 40 (1976).
334. Id. at 16.
335. Attorney General Guidelines for FBI Criminal Investigations, National 
Security Investigations, and the Collection of Foreign Intelligence: Hearing Before 
the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 2 (2008) [hereinafter Guidelines 
for Investigations & Intelligence] (statement of Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV,
Chairman, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence).
336. Id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Christopher S. Bond, Vice Chairman, S. 
Select Comm. on Intelligence). Of course, the consultation wasn’t made easy. 
According to Senator Rockefeller, “The Justice Department’s decision to prohibit 
the Committee from retaining a copy of the draft guidelines in preparing for this 
hearing and to restrict their public distribution has been unhelpful and has 
Shadow Administrative Constitutionalism 135
between Congress and DOJ is unprecedented speaks to the dearth of 
congressional oversight on the evolution of the Attorney General 
Guidelines to date.
The solution to a lack of congressional oversight is 
conceptually easy but practically difficult. It requires Congress to 
pass legislation governing the FBI and regularly exercise its statutory 
oversight authority, both of which require significant political capital 
and effort. However, the Snowden scandal may have created the 
momentum necessary to motivate congressional action in this area.
Senator Ron Wyden recently echoed this sentiment while imploring 
his colleagues to act stating, “‘If we do not seize this unique moment 
in out [sic] constitutional history to reform our surveillance laws and 
practices we are all going to live to regret it.’”337
C. Public Transparency 
The Church Committee made clear that “[s]ecrecy has shielded 
intelligence activities from full accountability and effective 
supervision.”338 The intervening years since the Church Committee 
released its report have been marked again by an increase in secrecy 
and a decrease in public awareness of the FBI’s intelligence-
gathering activities. As noted earlier, the Attorney General 
Guidelines are not released for public inspection and review before 
they are formally issued.339 In a 2008 hearing, Senator Rockefeller 
noted this on the record during a congressional hearing stating, 
“[T]he proposed guidelines have not been publicly released . . . for 
broader debate and broader comment.”340
Given that these Guidelines are increasingly unclassified upon 
issuance, there is no reason why they should not be unclassified and 
available for public deliberation before they are issued. A notice-
and-comment-style process should be required of the DOJ when it 
issues its Attorney General Guidelines and when the FBI issues its 
unnecessarily complicated our review of them.” Id. at 2 (statement of Sen. John D. 
Rockefeller IV, Chairman, S. Select Comm. on Intelligence).
337. Perry Stein, Wyden: If We Do Not Reform Our Surveillance Laws, We 
Will Live to Regret It, TPM LIVEWIRE (July 23, 2013, 11:35 AM), 
http://talkingpointsmemo.com/livewire/wyden-if-we-do-not-reform-our-
surveillance-laws-we-will-live-to-regret-it (quoting Sen. Ron Wyden). 
338. S. REP. NO. 94-755, bk. I, at 16.
339. See supra Section II.C.
340. Guidelines for Investigations & Intelligence, supra note 335, at 1. 
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DIOGs. Such a process would allow ex ante public discussion of the 
appropriate principles and procedures that govern the FBI.
The failure of public transparency, congressional oversight, 
judicial intervention, and internal executive branch checks and 
balances allowed for the insular agency decision making and the 
norm entrenchment that marked the evolution of the Attorney 
General Guidelines. But this is not inevitable. As this Part shows, we 
can force deliberation by manufacturing mechanisms to create public 
transparency, require congressional oversight, and institute 
intraexecutive checks and balances. 
CONCLUSION
This Article begins to tackle an under-theorized area in legal 
scholarship: the role of administrative agencies, often in isolation, in 
articulating the contours of constitutional protections in the area of 
national security. Our national security law is determined largely by 
administrative agencies—be it the DOJ, the DOD, the CIA, the NSA,
or the various fiefdoms within each of these agencies.
While the War on Terror has led to significant interest in the 
growth of Executive Power, this interest has largely focused on the 
roles of the President and his closest advisors in determining the 
contours of the President’s constitutional authority. However, given 
the high profile nature of presidential power grabs, many of these 
interpretations of executive authority ultimately are reviewed by the 
Supreme Court or at least reviewed by the public. As we saw with 
the series of Supreme Court decisions on the legal rights of 
Guantanamo detainees341 and the President’s renewed promises, in 
the face of serious public pressure, to close Guantanamo and rein in 
341. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510, 533 (2004) (holding that a 
citizen detainee challenging detention under the Fifth Amendment due process 
clause has the right to “receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a 
fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral 
decisionmaker”); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004) (holding that the federal 
habeas corpus statute granted federal courts jurisdiction to hear claims of noncitizen 
detainees held at Guantanamo); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 567 (2006)
(finding the military commissions created under the Detainee Treatment Act to be 
illegal); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (holding that Guantanamo 
detainees have constitutional rights to challenge their detention in United States 
courts).
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drone warfare,342 serious expansion of presidential power is often 
subject to checks and balances.
Comparatively, administrative agencies operate under the 
radar—not necessarily making the big decisions on detention 
authority or warrantless wiretapping programs, but making the 
smaller decisions on how much the FBI can do without obtaining a
warrant. These seemingly smaller things remain outside of public 
purview and escape public deliberation.
Administrative constitutionalism presents a democratic process 
by which to arrive at constitutional meaning. However, agency norm 
entrepreneurship that is not followed by robust deliberation threatens 
to allow agencies, the least accountable members of our tripartite 
government, the power to create and entrench constitutional norms 
that ultimately inform the development of constitutional law. 
Building structural solutions to force deliberation can ensure the 
legitimacy of administrative constitutionalism.
342. Tom Curry, Obama Reframes Counterterrorism Policy with New Rules 
on Drones, NBC NEWS (May 23, 2013, 11:00 AM), 
http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/05/23/18448515-obama-reframes-
counterterrorism-policy-with-new-rules-on-drones?lite. 

